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N the last three decades, the legal academy has experienced an explo-
sion of interest in legisprudence I and the rivaling theories of statutory
interpretation.2 Once largely ignored by academics in favor of consti-
tutional interpretation or common law development, 3 statutory interpre-
tation has become some of the most heavily trodden ground for legal
theorists4 and leading jurists.5 Despite this broad review of every aspect
of statutory interpretation, one area has remained largely terra incognita:
statutory interpretation and national security. While statutes touching on
labor, environmental, or economic interests are eagerly analyzed from a
variety of legisprudential viewpoints, statutory questions occurring in the
national security area are treated as virtually sui generis by both courts
and academics.
There are various possible reasons for the absence of legisprudential
influence and writings in this area. First, national security is an area far
removed from the core interest of most legisprudence scholars. Much of
the work in this area has focused on public choice issues and interest
group dynamics, including work by the Author.6 Statutory interpretation
1. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 240 (1988) (defining
legisprudence as "the systematic analysis of statutes within the framework of jurispruden-
tial philosophies about the role and nature of law.").
2. The area of statutory interpretation, however, can be traced back as far as the
sixteenth century in Heydon's Case. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B. 1584); see
also William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Sub-
stance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985).
3. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1 (1994)(describing statutory interpretation as "the Cinderella of legal scholarship.").
4. The number of academics in this field are now too numerous to mention. The
scholarship of legisprudence, however, now includes a wide array of provocative views of
statutory interpretation and the role of the courts in a tripartite system. Bill Eskridge and
Philip Frickey have produced a leading textbook on the various theories, including their
own substantial contributions to this field. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1.
5. Legisprudence has benefited from a troika of jurists who have shaped parts of this
debate. Associate Justice Antonin Scalia has become a virtual personification of new tex-
tualism and, more than any other Supreme Court Justice, has made statutory interpretation
a focus of his writings. Judge Richard Posner has written the most on this subject and can
rightfully claim to be one of the founding fathers of the public choice schools and legis-
prudential theory. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983). Finally, Judge Frank Easterbrook
has helped shape this debate with his views of dealism and contractual models of legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Text History and
Structure]; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term: Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984). Regard-
less of one's political or legal views, the academy owes these three jurists a great debt for
the enrichment of judicial opinions with coherent theoretical views of statutory interpreta-
tion and its role in democratic governance.
6. See e.g., Jonathan Thrley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legis-
prudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185 (1993); Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and
the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339 (1990) [hereinafter
Thrley, Transnational Discrimination].
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theories often emphasize models and market elements of the legislative
process that are less relevant to national security legislation.7 National
security is an area largely motivated by conduct removed from classic
"rent-seeking" and market motivations. While there are concentrated in-
terests in this area among the agencies and contractors, national security
legislation is not the subject of the same type of interest-seeking behav-
ior. Second, national security is an area combed by powerful winds of
constitutional law that add a different dimension to statutory interpreta-
tion. Given the degree of deference afforded to the Executive Branch in
this area, "national security" claims are treated as fundamentally differ-
ent from other areas of statutory interpretation by the courts. National
security has been a "jurispathic" 8 element in litigation that kills debates
that would rage in other areas. Statutory interpretation cases in this nar-
row area are commonly shaped by values outside the statute, particularly
notions of presidential power and executive privilege that militate heavily
in favor of summary judgments. Finally, national security has never been
viewed as a particularly good vehicle to discuss pluralistic issues that
drive much legisprudential scholarship. While civil rights statutes or envi-
ronmental statutes raise questions of insular or marginalized minorities,
national security laws are based, in principle, on a collective, nonfactional
interest.9
The isolation of national security cases from traditional statutory inter-
pretation critiques is evident in judicial decisions. Although most courts
are acutely sensitive to the danger of judicial activism and the restraining
principles of judicial interpretation, they appear less influenced by such
concerns in national security rulings. Accordingly, national security rul-
7. There is a great library of fine works applying public choice theories and economic
theories to the legislative process. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS (1981).
8. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983); see also MARTHA MINOW, FOREWORD: NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 1 (1993) (describing the term
jurispathic as referring "to the power and practice of a government that rules by displacing,
suppressing, or exterminating values that run counter to its own.").
9. Such areas are not entirely divorced from national security rulings. National se-
curity operations in areas like Puerto Rico can have a disproportionate effect on minority
populations. Certainly in the case of Area 51, the most at-risk population outside the facil-
ity were low-income individuals living in towns like Rachel, Nevada. In articles on legis-
prudence or public choice theories, the relative role of the legislative and judicial branches
in dealing with social issues, particularly the protection of insular minority interests, re-
mains a continuing debate. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New
Public Law Movement Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707,
732 (1991) (discussing the need for judicial action in areas like desegregation in the context
of the new legal process school); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation: Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Pro-
cess Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 720 (1987) (discussing views on the protection of insular
groups through judicial review versus political process); Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility
Factor: The Limits of Public Choice and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 211
(1996) (criticizing public choice literature as failing to consider the relative inability of
some minority groups to influence or capture the legislature).
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ings tend to reflect much greater bias, overt use of outcome-determina-
tive methodologies, and a general lack of theoretical consistency in
comparison to other areas. Judges who are strict textualists in every
other area will adopt approaches that are atextual and outcome-determi-
native in national security cases. These cases reveal an intriguing inter-
play between statutory interpretation and common law. In the national
security area, common law principles are applied routinely in areas sub-
ject to multiple statutory sources. Thus, while some scholars have called
for a reinforcement of common law authority in the age of statutes,"°
national security cases constitute an island of continued common law ju-
risprudence in a sea of statutory authority. These cases, however, raise a
largely unexplored question of the relative costs of preserving common
law principles rather than forcing disputes, where possible, into a statu-
tory framework. While this question raises many issues beyond the
scope of this Article, the Article will suggest some of the inherent difficul-
ties and dangers in the application of common law privileges to the na-
tional security area. This Article will also explore how the common law
can defeat the full range of interpretivist theories by moving a dispute
outside the context of a legislative scheme. My interest in this modest
endeavor is not to debate the relative value of textualist, intentionalist, or
purposivist theories but to show how any dialogue within the tripartite
system can be severely curtailed by some common law elements.
The recent Area 51 litigation offers an especially compelling example
of the legispurdential issues raised by national security cases. The Area
51 litigation was in part an attempt to advocate a view of statutory inter-
pretation in the national security area that was consistent with other
fields regulated by "command and control" statutes." The final decisions
in the litigation highlighted the distortive effect of national security and
common law privileges on statutory interpretation. The Area 51 litiga-
tion was composed of two largely identical and consolidated cases. Di-
vided between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in one case
and the military in the other case, the two filings raised the same regula-
tory functions and disclosures. The same common law privilege was ap-
plied in both cases. Yet, the district court reached diametrically different
results. In the first case against the EPA, the district court adopted a
traditional textualist approach to the case and balanced the environmen-
tal and the national security interests. In the second case against the mili-
tary, however, the court adopted a markedly different approach. Viewing
the case as a national security case, as opposed to an environmental case,
the court considered the merits of the case outside the structure of the
statute and based its decision in favor of the military entirely on a com-
10. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
11. While there is always some bias in writing on a case in which one participated,
Area 51 was selected in part as a pro bono effort by the Author because of its statutory
interpretation issues. Since the workers prevailed in one case and secured reversals and
remands in the other case, there are numerous points in this litigation on which the Author
agreed with both the district court and the court of appeals.
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mon law privilege. Eschewing any balancing of different public values in
the statute, the court's analysis recognized only a single public value as
embodied in the common law in favor of national security interests. This
Article is an effort to explain the sharp contrasts in these cases, albeit
with the full disclosure that the Author comes to the question as both an
academic and an advocate.12
In this litigation, environmental laws and national security claims came
into conflict at a "black facility," or a federal facility whose very existence
was denied by the government. On the most basic level, the court was
confronted with a simple and straightforward legal issue: the conflict of a
statutory source with a common law privilege. In any other area, the gen-
eral rule is that an unambiguous statutory source will supersede any com-
mon law privilege. In the national security area, however, common law
principles are often imposed directly or indirectly to achieve a result that
is normally anathema: the circumvention of the intent of Congress by an
Article III court. While such interpretative results would generally bring
cries of judicial activism, the national security area is routinely treated as
unique by our most conservative and textualist judges. Often couched
loosely in constitutional terms, the effective presumption in favor of na-
tional security claims seems irrebuttable in some cases. Federal courts
appear to view national security as a value that justifies heavy judicial
preference and manipulation in case analysis. Behind a facial neutrality
of a common law privilege is a bias that is only tolerated because it is a
majority bias. This is not to say that national security does not warrant
judicial deference on many levels. However, when a federal court is
presented with a clear statutory mandate, the use of common law doc-
trine to circumvent or blunt the effect of the law is a political judgment,
albeit a popular one. This bias remains strong despite the fact that the
claimed threats to national security are vague, implausible, or presented
in such an extreme manner that no statutory program could withstand the
common law attack.
The Area 51 litigation offers an insight into how courts actually operate
in an area of statutory interpretation and why they adopt particular inter-
pretative approaches. While many of us have been enthralled with vari-
ous theories and rationales for statutory interpretation, this case study
shows how removed we are from the realities of the conventional judicial
officer. Area 51 represented a facially outcome-determinative interpreta-
tion. Unable to deny the clarity of the federal law, the court instead
chose to apply a common law doctrine in contradiction to an express stat-
utory provision. More than any other contemporary case, Area 51 illus-
trates why national security has remained virtually untouched by the
legisprudence movement and the restrictive views of the courts in their
role as interpreters of federal law.
12. See supra note 11.
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This Article will approach these issues in four parts. In Part II, the
Article will first look at the Area 51 litigation itself. For those interested
in the underlying arguments and rulings, this section will show how the
conflict between the common law and statutory authority arose in the two
cases. In Part III, the Article will turn to the methodology of the court in
its two opinions. Specifically, the Article will show how the court strug-
gled to move part of the litigation out of the context of the command and
control statute and to adopt a jurispathic approach to the dispute through
the common law. The gravitational effect of the common law in this area
will be explored on three different levels of the court's analysis: the ques-
tion of preemption, the question of the scope of the common law privi-
lege, and, finally, the adoption of a controversial "mosaic" theory of
classification. In Part IV, the Article will explore the relative costs of
resolving such disputes through a common law privilege as opposed to a
statutory framework. The application of common law in cases like Area
51 effectively removes these disputes from both the context of a statutory
framework and the legislative process. By superimposing common law
principles on a command and control statute, courts significantly raise the
costs for the legislative process in dealing with national security issues.
The result is an area largely shaped by judicial choices that can be highly
political and dangerously countermajoritarian.
II. AREA 51: A CASE STUDY OF THE GRAVITATIONAL
EFFECT OF THE COMMON LAW ON STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AREA
The Area 51 litigation proved to be a fascinating microcosm of the is-
sues surrounding judicial interpretation in national security cases. The
aspect of the case that is most relevant to this article is the relationship
between the court's statutory interpretation and its conflicting application
of federal common law in the use of the state secrets privilege. While
legisprudence articles often deal with appellate decisions or broad pat-
terns, the Area 51 litigation offers a detailed account of a court's struggle
with traditional statutory interpretive principles and overwhelming com-
mon law bias in favor national security interests. How this process dis-
torted the court's treatment of public values in both statutory law and
common law is only evident with an understanding of the underlying facts
and allegations in the litigation.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The record in this case is voluminous and would be impossible to pres-
ent in any meaningful form in a single article. Composed of two cases,
the litigation ultimately produced six appeals, a successful emergency stay
to protect the workers from retaliation, and reversals of the lower court.' 3
13. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming,
reversing, and remanding in part the decisions of the district court is reported in Kasza v.
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The litigation is continuing at the time of this publication. 14
The locus of this litigation is a once secret facility commonly referred to
as "Area 51." The facility is located approximately ninety miles north-
west of Las Vegas next to a large dry lake, Groom Lake.15 The workers
filed two citizen suit actions as current or former workers at the facility
who may have been exposed to extremely harmful levels of hazardous
wastes. In addition to refusing to acknowledge the existence of this facil-
ity, the government also threatened that any worker who spoke to coun-
sel regarding his or her employment at the facility would be subject to
arrest. Despite these threats, workers did come forward and retained the
Environmental Crimes Project of George Washington University16 to
represent them in an effort to address the violations committed at the
facility for decades. Given the threats of prosecution, the workers sought
leave to file the action anonymously.
On September 9, 1994, the court granted the motion and placed the
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Kasza II]. The opinions of the district
court granting respondent Carol M. Browner partial summary judgment is reported in Doe
v. Browner, 902 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Nev. 1995) [hereinafter Doe ]; granting defendants
Perry, Lake and Widnall summary judgment is reported in Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 1459
(D. Nev. 1996) [hereinafter Frost II]; awarding the workers' attorneys' fees as the substan-
tially prevailing parties is reported in Kasza v. Browner, 932 F. Supp. 254 (D. Nev. 1996)
[hereinafter Kasza 1]; and denying the workers' first motion to compel discovery is re-
ported in Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434 (D. Nev. 1995) [hereinafter Frost 1]. Various opin-
ions denying motions to compel discovery and other matters were unreported, including
the district court's decision denying injunctive relief in Kasza I, requiring compliance with
the Resource Conservation Recovery Act's ("RCRA") public disclosure provisions. Here-
inafter "Kasza" will refer collectively to Doe I, Kasza I, and Kasza IL "Frost" will refer to
Frost I and Frost II.
14. Much of the material in this litigation remains under court seal despite a Court of
Appeals decision reversing and remanding on the sealing decisions of Judge Pro. The rec-
ord to the case is quite voluminous, and, rather than cite endless briefs, this background
material is taken from documents in the Author's office. These Area 51 documents are
being organized into a set of material that will be made available to the public after the end
of the litigation.
15. Containing a long runway, aircraft, vehicles, a large number of hangers, and fuel
storage tanks, the "Area 51" facility can be seen from public lands and in a variety of
photographs, including satellite photographs of the facility that are publicly available. For
several months during litigation, the government refused to admit the existence of the base
to either plaintiffs or, under direct questioning, the court. In late November, 1994, how-
ever, the government formally admitted that the facility existed and stated that it should be
referred to as "the operating location near Groom Lake." Frost 1, 161 F.R.D. at 435. The
government represented to the court that it had no prior knowledge of the use of the name
"Area 51." In response, the plaintiffs then introduced sworn statements of former workers
at "Area 51;" security badges containing to this designation; and government manuals (re-
leased annually) using the designation. The government, however, represented to the
court that it could not find any person in the government who knew the meaning of these
references.
16. The Environmental Crimes Project is one of three projects composing the Envi-
ronmental Law Advocacy Center, which the Author directs. The initiation of the litigation
in the Environmental Crimes Project reflects the underlying allegation of knowing that
environmental crimes were committed at the facility. The Area 51 litigation was ultimately




identities of the workers under court protection. 17 The workers then pro-
ceeded to file a complaint under RCRA with affidavits submitted under
seal, alleging that government officials and contractors were engaging in
extremely harmful hazardous waste operations under the cloak of secrecy
at Area 51. In the first suit against a "black facility," the workers signed
sworn statements that the military was burning large quantities of hazard-
ous wastes in trenches the size of football fields. According to the work-
ers, these trenches were regularly filled with 55-gallon drums, covered
with combustible material, doused with jet fuel and set ablaze. It is a
crime to burn hazardous wastes in an open pit or trench.18 It is also a
crime to dispose of, store, or transport hazardous wastes without a permit
under RCRA. This criminal conduct also included the shipment of haz-
ardous wastes by contractors from California to illegally burn or buy at
Area 51 without permits or other basic RCRA conditions. Workers were
prepared to testify under oath that federal officials openly acknowledged
the criminal acts committed at the facility and the use of national security
laws to prevent their detection.
In the two cases, plaintiffs alleged that workers at Area 51 became sick
from exposure to the hazardous fumes and several developed a rare and
painful skin disorder that resembles a fish-like scale which continually
cracks and bleeds. 19 One of the workers at the facility, Mr. Robert Frost,
died before this case was filed. A supervisor at the facility, Mr. Frost's
injuries were later the subject of a public administrative hearing and cor-
respondence that became part of the record in this case. Mr. Frost's tis-
sues were tested and found to contain elevated levels of hazardous
substances consistent with exposure to the burning of hazardous wastes. 20
17. Despite these orders, the government attempted during the appeal of the cases to
learn the identities of the litigants with the approval of the district court. This led to a rare
emergency appeal and emergency stay of Judge Pro's order by the Ninth Circuit, which
found that the workers satisfied the high standard of proof in showing a threat by the
government from these interviews. The government dropped its attempt after the emer-
gency stay order.
18. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 444, § 8686 (1994).
19. Because the workers' identities were sealed to protect them from government re-
taliation, they never appeared in court or spoke openly on the case. However, workers
were made available to CBS' "60 Minutes" with concealed voices and images to give an
account of the burning operations at Area 51. See 60 Minutes: Area 51: Catch 22; Workers
at Nonexistent Air Force Base Sue Government to Release Hazardous Waste Information
(CBS television broadcast, Mar. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Area 51: Catch 22].
20. After his death, tissue and fat samples were removed and tested at Rutgers Uni-
versity by Dr. Peter Kahn, who also worked on the Agent Orange study. Kahn found
traces of a great variety of chemicals consistent with the accounts of the hazardous wastes
burned at the facility including dioxins and dibenzoflourenes. See ABC World News To-
night. Groom Lake Employees Health Complaints (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 1,
1994). Some of these chemicals had never been encountered in testing before the Frost
case. Mr. Frost's widow, Ms. Helen Frost, is one of the plaintiffs in this action. In 1995,
Mr. Walter Kasza, one of the John Doe workers, died of cancer allegedly linked to his
exposure to hazardous waste operations at Area 51. Mr. Kasza worked closely with Mr.
Frost at Area 51. The court agreed to substitute Mr. Kasza's widow, Stella, as a party in
the action.
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The workers brought the two separate citizen suit actions under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by RCRA. The first action,
Kasza, charged the Administrator of the EPA with the failure to perform
nondiscretionary regulatory functions at Area 51, including her obliga-
tions to inspect the facility for hazardous waste activity, to make available
to the public all reports gathered during such inspections, 21 and to notify
the Air Force of its duty to conduct a hazardous waste inventory for the
facility. The workers alleged that, absent a presidential exemption under
RCRA, the military had to disclose this material on an annual basis. 22
The workers sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as any other
relief the court deemed appropriate and just. The second action, Frost v.
Perry, charged the Secretary of the United States Department of Defense
and other executive officers with specific violations of certain RCRA pro-
visions, including the failure to conduct hazardous waste inventories at
Area 51, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 6937, and the burning of hazard-
ous wastes in open air pits. The workers sought injunctive and declaratory
relief.23
21. Section 3007(b) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(b), provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Any records, reports, or information (including records, reports, or infor-
mation obtained by representatives of the Environmental Protection
Agency) obtained from any person under this section shall be available to
the public, except that upon a showing satisfactory to the Administrator (or
the State, as the case may be) by any person that records, reports, or infor-
mation, or particular part thereof, to which the Administrator (or the State,
as the case may be) or any officer, employee or representative thereof has
access under this section if made public, would divulge information entitled
to protection under section 1905 of Title 18, such information or particular
portion thereof shall be considered confidential in accordance with the pur-
poses of that section ....
42 U.S.C. § 6927(b) (1999).
22. Section 6001(a) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a), provides in
pertinent part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over
any solid waste management facility or disposal site, or (2) engaged in any
activity resulting, or which may result, in the disposal or management of solid
waste or hazardous waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and procedural
(including any requirement for permits or reporting or any provisions for
injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce
such relief), respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous
waste disposal and management in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as any person is subject to such requirements .... The President may ex-
empt any solid waste management facility of any department, agency, or in-
strumentality in the executive branch from compliance with such a
requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United
States to do so.
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1999).
23. From the outset, the Area 51 litigation generated hundreds of media stories across
the country and abroad. Despite government refusals to even admit the existence of the
base for the first part of the litigation, media repeatedly published photographs of the
bases and its operations from nearby public lands. See, e.g., Jason Vest, Alien Toxins, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 16, 1999, at 45; Tony Batt, Workers' Attorney Appeals to Supreme
Court in Area 51 Case, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 4, 1998, at 3B; Debra Cassens, National
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B. RELEVANT LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND JUDICIAL RULINGS
In Kasza, Browner answered the workers' complaint by denying
knowledge of the existence of Area 51 and invoked the military and state
secrets privilege (hereinafter "state secrets privilege") as an affirmative
defense. Because this claim of privilege was improperly raised and sup-
ported, plaintiffs moved to strike this claim. Browner subsequently
agreed that the privilege was improperly raised and withdrew the claim of
privilege from its answer. The workers commenced discovery and re-
quested a variety of EPA regulatory documents and written responses to
requests for admissions and interrogatories. In response, Browner pro-
vided some information pertaining to Area 51, including the fact that the
EPA had never inspected Area 51, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 6927,24
and that the federal agencies operating that same facility had never con-
ducted a hazardous waste inventory, as they were required under 42
U.S.C. § 6937. Browner, however, refused to respond to a majority of the
workers' discovery requests under a renewed assertion of the state secrets
privilege. 25 To support this second assertion of the state secrets privilege
over EPA regulatory documents and related written inquiries, Browner
relied upon an affidavit of the Secretary of the United States Department
of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall. The workers filed a series of motions to
compel Browner to respond to discovery requests in complete, redacted
or summarized form.
Security v. Workers' Health, 84 ABA J. 43 (1998); CNN Earth Matters: Environmental News
of the Week (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1997); Vincent J. Schodolski, Plaintiffs Seek
Access to Air Base Secrets, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 1997, at N12; CNN The World Today: Super
Secret Installation in Nevada Desert, (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1997); Jill
Neimark, Dispatch from Dreamland; UFO Obsessions, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1997, at
50; Richard Leiby, Secrets Under the Sun, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at F01; CNN Ameri-
can Edge: What is Area 51; Meteors May Be the Secret to the Beginning of Life (CNN
television broadcast, July 2, 1997); Ed Vulliamy, Nightmare in Dreamland, THE OBSERVER,
July 14, 1996, at 21; Area 51: Catch 22, supra note 19; Benjamin Wittes, Groom Lake Judge
Wants Disclosure, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at 9 [hereinafter Wittes, Groom Lake];
Jennifer Tanaka, Secrecy Standards, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1995, at 10; Benjamin Wittes,
Suddenly, Your Briefcase is Classified; Groom Lake Litigation Test Government's Secrecy
Standards, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 1995, at 12; David C. Morrison, Now Here's a Toxic
Case, NAT'L J., June 24, 1995; Ed Vulliamy, Dying for an American Dreamland, THE OB-
SERVER, Dec. 4, 1994, at 15; CBS Evening News: Top-Secret US Air Base May Be About to
be Revealed to the Public (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 25, 1994); CNN News: Civilians
Sue Secret Air Base in Nevada (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1994); Groom Lake
Employees, supra note 20; Donovan Webster, Area 51, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1994, at 32.
24. Section 3007(c) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c), provides in
pertinent part:
The Administrator shall undertake on an annual basis a thorough inspection
of each facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste
which is owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States to enforce its compliance with this subchapter and the reg-
ulations promulgated thereunder .... The records of such inspections shall
be available to the public as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 6927(c) (1999).
25. Information Browner withheld from plaintiffs under a claim of privilege included
the admission or denial of the statement that "paint wastes," "pesticide wastes," or "haz-
ardous wastes" of any type had ever been generated, stored, or disposed of at Area 51.
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In Frost, the Air Force answered the workers' complaint by refusing to
admit or deny the existence of the facility and also by asserting the state
secrets privilege as an affirmative defense. 26 After the workers moved to
strike the Air Force's first assertion of the state secrets privilege, defend-
ants withdrew the national security defense with an admission that the
assertion was unsupported and premature. After months of litigation, in
November 1994, the Air Force admitted the existence of the facility and
discovery commenced. In February 1995, Secretary Widnall then sup-
plied a declaration in support of a renewed claim of state secrets privi-
lege. The public Widnall declaration identified ten categories of
information that the Secretary sought to withhold from the plaintiffs and
the public.27 In response to the Widnall declaration, the workers re-
quested various items of information through discovery that were not en-
compassed within any of the ten categories identified. The Government,
however, refused to respond to most of the workers' discovery requests,
asserting that a mosaic theory of classification barred disclosure.28 Under
this theory, even the most innocuous unclassified fact is treated as classi-
fied to avoid contributing to a "mosaic" of information available to for-
eign intelligence. Thus, the United States argued that even facts printed
previously on the front page of the New York Times or visible from public
lands can be treated as classified for the purposes of the state secrets
privilege to prevent the creation of a mosaic. The workers filed a series
of motions to compel the government's answers to discovery, including
the reasons why a claim of privilege would bar disclosure of generic infor-
mation, such as the presence of "hazardous wastes" without revealing
specific wastes or waste quantities. The workers also argued that the gov-
ernment could redact sensitive information from the requested docu-
ments or summarize information to avoid disclosure of sensitive
information.
As part of the support for their arguments, the workers placed into the
record a copy of a publicly available government manual, containing no
classification markings, which related to Area 51.29 This widely available
26. From the commencement of the workers' suits, all of the defendants, in both
Kasza and Frost, were represented by the same Department of Justice attorneys. The
workers requested that the district court disallow the same attorneys from simultaneously
representing both a regulating and regulated agency in the same enforcement action. The
district court denied the workers' motion, finding that the Attorney General alone pos-
sesses the authority to determine whether a conflict of interests exists between federal
agencies and that the federal judiciary did not even have authority to conduct an inquiry
into the matter.
27. See Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 436-37 (D. Nev. 1995) (hereinafter Frost I).
The ten categories of information claimed as privileged are (a) program names; (b) the
mission of the facility; (c) capabilities; (d) military plans; (e) intelligence sources; (f) scien-
tific or technological matters; (g) certain physical characteristics; (h) budget, finance, and
contracting relationships; (i) personnel matters; and (j) security sensitive environmental
data. See id. at 437.
28. Under a claim of privilege defendants refused to admit or deny the existence of
specific items that would constitute "hazardous waste" including jet fuel, a car battery, and
used equipment lubrication oil at this facility.
29. See generally Wittes, Groom Lake, supra note 23, at 12.
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manual contained much of the information that defendants claimed as
privileged. Upon receipt of this manual, defendants classified the manual
and requested both the district court and plaintiffs to relinquish their cop-
ies of the manual as well as the motion, supporting memorandum of law,
and a significant number of files in opposing counsel's office. 30 The court
held a sealed hearing on the matter. During the hearing, the Justice De-
partment renewed its request and also requested that the court order the
surrender of the files in counsel's office. The district court imposed vari-
ous restrictions on the parties for the remainder of the case, including
orders that filings be sealed and that counsel restrict access to the area
until the matter of the manual was resolved.31 The court eventually de-
termined that it did not have the jurisdiction to order plaintiffs to turn
over the manual, their motion and related materials. However, the court
retained the seal over the contents of the Author's office, access to which
remains restricted to anyone but counsel.32
On May 19, 1995, the EPA moved for summary judgment, asserting
that it had fulfilled its obligations under 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c) by inspecting
Area 51 and that it had received a hazardous waste inventory, conducted
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6937,33 from the Air Force relating to Area 51.
Accordingly, the EPA argued that the workers' claims for relief were now
moot. The EPA did not provide the plaintiffs or the public with copies of
30. This order included the government's demand that counsel contact any reporter
who may have obtained public copies of the filing. Since there was no record, this required
that a warning be sent to hundreds of media organizations notifying them that material
they may have received was subsequently classified. The government asked them to return
the copies of the manual. No one complied. Some, however, proceeded to state that the
manual was on the Internet at various sites. See id.
31. Rather than deal with the order directly, the Court of Appeals adopted a remarka-
bly misleading semantic device. The Court of Appeals suggested in a footnote that there
are no significant restrictions in place over counsel's "office." See Kasza II, 133 F.3d at
1170 n.9. It is certainly true that the court order imposed a seal on the contents of the
office, which is an order still in effect. At the insistence of the government, the office was
secured under federal guidelines governing classified information, including restrictions to
access. There is no disagreement that the district court placed all of the material claimed
as classified under a court seal and issued two orders regarding the allegedly classified
documents. This was one of the "sealing" orders that was remanded on appeal.
32. In response to the workers' motions to compel, and related motions to redact or
summarize privileged information, defendants in both cases supplied the district court with
an in camera, ex parte document from General Thomas Moorman. See Frost 11, 919 F.
Supp. at 1465. The Moorman declaration argued in support of extending the Widnall dec-
laration to bar the majority of the workers' discovery requests. General Moorman further
argued that redaction or summarization was implausible. In both cases, the district court
upheld the workers' claims of privilege and denied the workers' requests for redaction or
summarization.
33. Section 3016 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act provides in pertinent part:
Each Federal agency shall undertake a continuing program to compile, pub-
lish, and submit to the Administrator (and to the State in the case of sites in
States having an authorized hazardous waste program) an inventory of each
site which the Federal agency owns or operates or has owned or operated at
which hazardous waste is stored, treated, or disposed of or has been disposed
of at any time. The inventory shall be submitted every two years beginning
January 31, 1986. Such inventory shall be available to the public as provided
in section 6927(b) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 6937(a) (1999).
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the inspection and inventory reports as required by 42 U.S.C. § 6927(b),
claiming that the entirety of these reports was covered by the state secrets
privilege. On June 16, 1995, the Air Force, and related entities, also
moved for summary judgment. The Air Force did not, however, argue
mootness. Instead, the Air Force argued that the state secrets privilege
previously invoked by Secretary Widnall prevented the workers from
making a prima facie showing that it had violated any RCRA provision
with regard to Area 51. 34
The district court reviewed the hazardous waste inspection and inven-
tory reports ex parte and in camera. Finding these documents to be satis-
factory, the court entered partial summary judgment in Kasza with regard
to the workers' inspection and inventory claims, finding them to be satis-
fied.35 Notably, the court chose to rule that these statutory claims were
satisfied (and therefore moot) as opposed to barred under the common
law. The court denied Browner summary judgment on the workers' pub-
lic disclosure claim and ordered the government either to obtain a presi-
dential exemption or to disclose the inventory and inspection reports as
required under 42 U.S.C. § 6927(b). 36 The court continued to withhold
these documents, as well as any redacted or summarized version, from
the workers finding that they were protected from disclosure under Air
Force Secretary Widnall's claim of state secrets privilege.37 On Septem-
ber 29, 1995, President Clinton issued a presidential determination that
exempted from public disclosure any information relating to Area 51
classified by the Air Force.38 Thereafter, the district court entered a de-
claratory judgment in favor of the workers with regard to their claim that
Browner had violated the public disclosure requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§ 6927. 39 Subsequently, the district court found the workers to be the
substantially prevailing parties with regard to their inspection claims, but
not their public disclosure claim, for purposes of attorney fees.40
34. See Frost 11, 919 F. Supp. at 1465.
35. See Doe I, 902 F. Supp. at 1249.
36. See id. at 1252.
37. The court initially attributed the invocation of the privilege to Browner. The court
noted that past cases require the invoking agency head to review the documents withheld
under the privilege. Here, Browner was invoking in a case separate from the Air Force
case to withhold EPA documents. Yet, the workers demonstrated that Browner had never
invoked a claim of privilege over EPA regulatory documents. After accepting this error,
however, the court simply modified its order to reflect that Secretary Widnall had made a
claim of privilege. Widnall, however, could not have reviewed the EPA documents and the
Air Force was not a party in the EPA case.
38. See Kasza II, 133 F.3d at 1164. Due to the litigation, President Clinton has contin-
ued to issue his annual exemption in compliance with the Act. Christine Dorsey, Clinton
Reaffirms Area 51 Must Remain Classified Information, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Feb. 2, 2000,
at 4B.
39. See id.
40. In Kasza, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment deci-
sion while reversing and remanding issues on attorneys fees and sealing orders. Kasza v.
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit rejected the workers' conten-
tion that the district court erred by (1) basing its summary judgment on information it also
found to be privileged, (2) finding the workers' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
to be moot, (3) rejecting the workers' argument that Browner, not Widnall, was the appro-
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The plaintiffs successfully appealed the district court's decision in
Kasza on a variety of issues, including its decision not to declare the
workers as prevailing parties on all issues. On February 24, 2000, the
district court issued its decision on remand, granting the workers' re-
quested relief on some sealed material and reversing its prior decision in
favor of the government on the public disclosure claims in the case. The
court held
that its earlier finding that Kasza was not a substantially prevailing
party with regard to her public disclosure claims was wrong and
should be corrected. Clearly, Kasza's lawsuit was the catalyst for re-
quiring the EPA to comply with RCRA by either publicly releasing
the information contained in the inspection and inventory reports or
by obtaining a Presidential Exemption under RCRA § 6001(a). 41
In Frost I, the district court granted the military's motion for summary
judgment finding the entire subject matter of the RCRA citizen suit to be
a state secret.42 In the Frost I decision, the court resolved the entire case
within the context of the common law privilege. Unlike Kasza, the court
did not balance the interests of national security and the express interests
of the RCRA in resolving the dispute. Rather, the court simply found the
privilege properly raised and the entire subject matter of the citizen suit
action to be a classified matter.43 After the workers secured a reversal
and remand of Frost requiring further findings on the trial court's refusal
priate agency head to invoke a claim of privilege over EPA regulatory information and that
Browner's reliance upon another executive officer's claim of privilege was improper, (4)
rejecting the workers' argument that the presidential declaration issued by President Clin-
ton failed to meet the requirements of RCRA, and (5) finding that, as a matter of law, the
Attorney General (and not the federal courts) was empowered to resolve any potential
conflict of interest in the dual representation of a federal regulating agency and regulated
agency by the same set of attorneys.
41. Frost v. Cohen, CV-S-94-714-PMP (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2000) (order of Judge Philip
Pro). Since this decision was handed down shortly before publication, no case citation is
available. Plaintiffs are appealing the portions of the decision that relate to the Frost case.
42. See Frost 1, 919 F. Supp. at 1470.
43. The appellate panel split in affirming the district court's decision based on the state
secrets privilege. Judge A. Wallace Tashima filed a concurrence arguing that the state
secrets privilege should have never been applied to the RCRA issues in the case. See id.
In his eleven-page opinion, Judge Tashima agreed with plaintiffs that Congress preempted
the state secrets privilege with respect to hazardous waste information by enacting the
RCRA's national security exemption provision. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the workers' arguments that the district court erred by (1) finding the entire subject matter
of the suit to be a state secret despite the fact that (a) the government had publicly dis-
closed hazardous waste information relating to Area 51, and (b) the court itself had
reached the merits of the companion case-Kasza, which addressed the same regulatory
information produced by the same parties at the same facility; (2) finding the entire subject
matter of a RCRA enforcement action a state secret; (3) allowing the government to claim
the operative term of RCRA, "hazardous wastes," as a state secret in this case, in order to
refuse the mere admission or denial that "hazardous waste" was ever stored, treated or
disposed of at the facility; (4) employing procedures for the assertion and application of
the state secrets privilege rejected or disfavored by other federal courts; (5) applying a
"mosaic theory" of the state secrets privilege to non-intelligence gathering activities to bar
the disclosure of information that did not fall into one of the ten categories set forth in
Secretary Widnall's declaration; and (6) finding for the first time in any federal action that
the Executive Branch could invoke a claim of privilege to withhold evidence of criminal
conduct.
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to declare the workers the prevailing parties in the case, Judge Pro again
refused to declare the workers to be prevailing parties in the case due to
the application of the privilege. 44
C. THE GRAVITATIONAL EFFECT OF THE COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE
ON THE ANALYSIS IN KASZA AND FROST
The Area 51 litigation presented a basic question of statutory interpre-
tation that would likely have posed little difficulty for any judge outside
of the national security area.4 5 Congress clearly enacted a statutory
framework for environmental compliance at all federal facilities as well as
a straightforward process for presidential waivers based on national se-
curity from such compliance. There was no gap to be filled; no ambiguity
to be addressed. Rather, the central controversy related to the applica-
tion of a clear environmental statute to a national security site.
The Area 51 cases are hardly unique in the use of common law prefer-
ence for national security interests. What is unique is the fact that the
court had two cases that were indistinguishable, except for the defend-
ants. In Kasza, the court viewed the case as a simple issue of statutory
interpretation and adopted a textualist approach. As part of this ap-
proach, the court recognized the competing public values balanced in the
statute between environmental law and national security interests. Pro
specifically rejected the overbroad claims of the Administration that na-
tional security trumped the environmental statute.46 In Kasza, the court
allowed the Administration to correct its violations of federal law with
the issuance of a proper presidential exemption.4 7 Without withdrawing
their argument that the President's constitutional authority as Com-
mander in Chief trumped any environmental statutes, the United States
complied on September 29, 1995, and issued the first presidential exemp-
tion for a black facility.4 8
44. Frost v. Cohen, CV-S-94-714-PMP (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2000) (order of Judge Philip
Pro). The district court did not offer any new explanation for the different treatment of the
cases beyond one line suggesting that "to the extent Frost's claims coincided with those in
Kasza under RCRA, Frost's action cannot, as a practical matter, be viewed as having
brought about the results which were substantially achieved ... in the Kasza case." Id.
This decision, which was released shortly before the publication of this article, will be
appealed.
45. Cf. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (emphasizing that
"[ojur task is to give effect to the will of Congress... where its will has been expressed in
reasonably plain terms"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (stressing that "language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
46. See Doe I, 902 F. Supp. at 1251 ("The Court ... finds the apparent tension [be-
tween national security laws and the RCRA] cited by the Administrator to be illusory.").
47. Pro then effectively applied this exemption to prior years by refusing to order pro-
duction of material never exempted during prior annual periods. The workers immediately
opposed this ruling since Congress mandated an annual period for exemption and the law
contained no provision for retroapplication of a belated exemption.
48. On September 29, 1995, President Clinton issued a presidential determination that
purported to exempt from public disclosure any classified information related to the
Groom Lake facility. The Presidential exemption provided:
I find that it is in the paramount interest of the United States to exempt the
United States's Air Force's operating location near Groom Lake, Nevada
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It was the Frost ruling, however, that showed the greatest gravitational
pull of national security values. Rather than ruling, as in Kasza, that the
military failed to comply with federal law or balancing the interests of the
environmental and national security, Pro ruled that the entire matter was
a state secret. Under the national security paradigm, there are not com-
peting public values but only one value: national security. The difference
between the two rulings could not be more evident than in the first two
counts. In granting summary judgment, the court specifically stated that
"[the workers] cannot provide the essential evidence to establish [their]
prima facie case for any of [their] eleven claims due to the Defendants'
assertion of the military and state secrets privilege. ' 49 In the Kasza and
Frost actions, however, the first claims were virtually identical. In Kasza,
the court ruled on the first claim and found the workers to be the prevail-
ing party in forcing an inspection and inventory of the facility. In Frost,
however, the court ruled that it could not reach this issue since any con-
sideration would be barred under the privilege.
In the Frost Complaint, the workers first alleged that the government
never complied, published, or submitted to the EPA an inventory of
Groom Lake base, including a list of the hazardous waste that has been
stored, treated, or disposed of at Groom Lake base. The first claim in the
Frost complaint contained the same language as the first claim of the
Kasza Complaint, which referred to the Administrator's failure in requir-
ing the same act at the same facility. The first claim in the Kasza alleged
that the U.S. Air Force has never complied, published, or submitted to
the U.S. EPA an inventory including Groom Lake base or a list of the
hazardous waste that is stored, treated, or disposed of or that has been
disposed of at Groom Lake base.
In its summary judgment decision on the Kasza Complaint, the court
openly discussed the fact that a § 6927 inspection and a § 6937 inventory
were completed due to the workers' citizen suit action.50 Moreover, the
government openly discussed the completion of the inventory at the facil-
ity and the future arrangements for inspections and inventories in public
filings. The fact that an inventory had been completed was hardly a se-
cret since the government used the fact of its completion to establish the
case for summary judgment. Thus, these two cases began with the same
(the subject of litigation in Kasza v. Browner (D. Nev. CV-S-94-795-PMP (
D. Nev. Sept. 9, 1994)) and Frost v. Perry (D. Nev. CV-S-94-714-PMP) (D.
Nev. Aug. 15, 1994)) from any applicable requirement for the disclosure to
unauthorized persons of classified information concerning that operating
location.
Presidential Determination No. 95-45, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,823 (1995). Per the conditions of
the final order in the Area 51 litigation, President Clinton has reissued this order on an
annual basis. See, e.g., Presidential Determination No. 96-54, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,679 (1996);
Presidential Determination No. 97-35, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,647 (1997).
49. Frost II, 919 F. Supp. at 1468.
50. See Doe 1, 902 F. Supp. at 1249-50 ("Simply put, Plaintiffs' objectives in bringing
this citizen suit have been accomplished: the Administrator has performed her nondiscre-
tionary duties under RCRA with regard to the inspection and inventorying of the operat-
ing location near Groom Lake."); Id. at 1250; see also Kasza I, 932 F. Supp. at 257-58.
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general claim dealing with the same inventory performed at the same fa-
cility by the same the government. Moreover, the state secrets privilege
was invoked in both cases by the Secretary of the Air Force as to many of
the same documents, including the critical inventory reports. In one case,
the court reached the inventory claim, declared the workers to be the
prevailing party and dismissed the inventory claim as moot, due to the
completion of the inventory. In the other case, the court ruled that the
issue was not moot, but rather untriable, due to the state secrets privi-
lege.51 This obvious contradiction shows not only the powerful effect of
framing a case in common law terms, but the arbitrary use of the privilege
to produce outcome-determinative results.
Putting aside the obvious disconnect between the national security rul-
ings in the two cases, the state secrets privilege in Frost proved the most
interesting element of the litigation. This litigation presented the first
time that the state secrets privilege, a common law creation, has come
into conflict with the federal hazardous waste provisions of RCRA. The
tension between the state secrets privilege and RCRA produced a host of
issues of first impression, including the circumstances under which the
entire subject matter of a case (and even the operative regulatory term of
a statute) can be declared a state secret.52 As will be shown below, how-
ever, these issues were resolved outside of traditional rules of statutory
interpretation.
III. THE INTERPLAY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE COMMON LAW IN THE AREA 51 LITIGATION
The court's decisions in Kasza and Frost contained one common meth-
odological element. The court viewed any determination made under
common law evidentiary rules to be largely unaffected by the context of
the litigation, even if the common law rule would defeat a command and
control statute. Accordingly, the court ruled that the common law privi-
lege was not preempted by RCRA and applied an absolute mosaic theory
without any consideration of contradictions with the statutory program.53
The two cases, however, took sharply different (and inexplicable routes)
51. At the very least, the court should have ruled as to the first claim and declared the
matter moot and the workers as prevailing party due to an inventory having been com-
pleted. Clearly, the court cannot state, as a legal matter, that it cannot reach this question
after doing so only months before in a related case. While the Ninth Circuit did not re-
verse Pro on this obvious error, it did reverse and remand, for Pro to reconsider, whether
the workers should be declared the prevailing party in Frost as they had in Kasza. See
Kasza II, 133 F.3d 1159.
52. One of the most ominous aspects of this case concerns the military's use of the
privilege to withhold evidence of any criminal conduct committed at the facility in the
context of the hazardous waste violations. The workers sought information from defend-
ants that could only constitute criminal acts if committed. Respondents countered by stat-
ing that, if criminal conduct did occur at the facility, the Executive Branch could
legitimately claim executive privilege as to evidence of its own criminal acts. The district
court agreed, and the court of appeals simply chose not to address this issue in upholding
the use of the privilege.
53. See Frost II, 919 F. Supp. 1459.
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in the final judgment of the court on the merits. Ultimately, the district
court found the EPA in violation of the statute without the need to refer
to the specific disclosures mandated under the statute. The court simply
gave the President the choice of compliance or forced disclosure. 54 Yet,
in Frost, the court structured its final decision in terms of a national secur-
ity case with little dependence on the statutory scheme. Where Kasza
focused on the statutory language and process for exemption, Frost fo-
cused on the state secrets privilege and the necessities of national secur-
ity. Thus, in Frost, the common law privilege drove the analysis as a value
that was exogenous to the statute. While courts are expected to engage in
statutory interpretation with some underlying concept of the role of the
judiciary in the tripartite system, the Frost case reveals little more than
outcome-determinative methods of interpretation to satisfy an overriding
and univocal judicial purpose.
A. THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE COMPANY OF
THE COMMON LAW
National security cases easily fulfill every fear of textualists in the area
of statutory interpretation. The textualist school would restrict courts in
their role as interpreters of federal law to avoid the danger of
countermajoritarian or elitist influence by the judiciary.5 5 A textualist-
based theory of interpretation promotes the democratic process in resolv-
ing such conflicts through democratic formalism that minimizes the
court's role.56 Many judges appointed after the first Reagan Administra-
tion advocated a philosophy that was heavily textualist as part of the
political backlash against "judicial activism." The period of denounced
liberal interpretation 57 was followed by a period of heavily text-bound
rulings with Associate Justice Antonin Scalia,58 Judge Frank Easter-
54. See Doe 1, 902 F. Supp. at 1252.
55. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 646 (1990)
[hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism] (noting that this formalistic approach "posits
that judicial interpreters can and should be tightly constrained by the objectively determi-
nable meaning of a statute; if unelected judges exercise much discretion in these cases,
democratic governance is threatened").
56. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 539
(1997) (under this view "democratic formalism ensures that statutory and constitutional
provisions will not be given 'spirits' and 'purposes' attributable to the (unenacted) political
morality of any particular era.").
57. Notably, however, even Justices known for more liberal interpretation defended
textualists' rulings, when essential to avoid "an aimless journey." United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985).
58. Justice Scalia's approach has been described as "dogmatic textualism" due to its
heavy reliance of plain meaning and hostility toward legislative history. WILLIAM N. Es-
KRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 120 (1994); see also Karin P. Shel-
don, "It's Not My Job to Care": Understanding Justice Scalia's Method of Statutory
Interpretation Through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 487 (1997).
See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280-81
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construc-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 415 n.50 (1994) [hereinafter Karkkainen, "Plain
Meaning"]. Bill Eskridge has labeled these contemporary advocates of textualism the
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brook59 and other jurists at the forefront. 60 In Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co.,61 Scalia described his brand of new textualism:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined,
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been under-
stood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress, but rather on
the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and
ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the
whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to men-
tion the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the sur-
rounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated-a
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always
has in mind.62
There are two goals motivating the textualist approach that are particu-
larly relevant to the Area 51 litigation. First, textualism is seen as a way
of preventing Congress from effectively delegating its authority to judges
in resolving problems outside of the bicameral system.63 Second, textual-
ism ideally encourages Congress to supply clear language under the as-
sumption that courts will not go beyond the text in the application of
federal laws.64 The first rationale is particularly important in national se-
"New Textualists" to distinguish them from their predecessors. See Eskridge, The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 passim. Justice Scalia is joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas in placing a heavy emphasis on textualist interpretation. See "Plain Meaning", 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y at 401. My colleague, Greg Maggs, offered a particularly valua-
ble insight into Scalia's interpretative approach. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textu-
alism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CoNy. L. REV. 393 (1996);
see also Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
59. Easterbrook has expressed a distinctly non-evolutionary branch of textualism. See
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 5, at 69 ("Laws are designed to bind,
to perpetuate a solution devised by the enacting legislature, and do not change unless the
legislature affirmatively enacts something new.").
60. Other justices, like Justice Breyer, have also weighed into this debate from a differ-
ent perspective from Justice Scalia. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History
in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992). Since Justice Scalia does consider
the overall statute in a holistic interpretation, he is often referred to as a "New Textualist."
See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. at 655.
61. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
62. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Robert J. Martineau,
Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory
Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1993) (discussing Scalia's concurrence and
new textualist views).
63. Professor John Manning elaborated:
[T]extualism, properly understood, implements a special application of the
nondelegation doctrine [since] [u]nder that view, textualism serves only to
keep Congress from delegating to its own agents or members the de facto
authority to "say what the law is" outside the process of bicameralism and
presentment-a concern that is not present with other extratextual sources
of meaning.
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of the Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1337, 1338 (1998).
64. Professor Manning described this view:
[Interpretative decisions based on such things as legislative history by courts
contradict] a crucial structural premise of the Constitution: lawmaking and
law-elaboration must be distinct so that legislators will have a structural in-
centive not to enact vague or ambiguous laws. If Congress must rely on the
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curity cases, an area where there may be less legislative interest than ar-
eas with greater relevance to voters and classic rent seekers. Likewise,
the second rationale is compelling in this area because national security
questions are often left ambiguous in statutory programs. RCRA is an
exception where Congress did precisely what textualists ask: Congress
mandated a process for the treatment of national security claims by the
President within the confines of the command and control statute.
If one were to rule on the text or face of the statute,65 the outcome
would appear clear. Congress spoke directly to areas in which the Presi-
dent did not wish to comply with all or parts of RCRA. In creating a
national security exemption, Congress did not provide for any additional
avenues or methods of withholding information. The national security
exemption effectively codified the common law privilege with one critical
difference: exemptions would be incorporated into several command and
control systems and would have to be made on both a public and annual
basis. The court followed a textualist approach in Kasza but, in dealing
with military defendants on the same claim, abandoned the text and
moved its decision outside the statutory framework. In Frost, the court
was clearly uncomfortable with rejecting national security claims or forc-
ing compliance by the military to fulfill a perceived lesser goal of environ-
mental compliance. Rather than apply the clear language of the statute
in Frost, the court found a method to recognize Congress' obvious intent
while protecting the military from actual enforcement of Congress' provi-
sions on federal facilities. Not only did this approach depart from textu-
alist values, but it defeated a collateral goal of textualism: to create a
predictable judicial role in interpreting statutory language, giving Con-
gress an incentive to draft language with care and precision.66
The Frost case offers an interesting variation of the problem described
by textualists like Easterbrook, that judicial discretion in statutory inter-
executive and judiciary, rather than its own agents, to resolve statutory ambi-
guity, it cedes policymaking discretion to the other branches when it enacts
such laws. In the absence of meaningful, direct judicial enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine, that structural constraint acts as an important deter-
rent against the legislature's filling in the details of statutes without adhering
to the constitutionally prescribed process of bicameralism and presentment.
Id.
65. There is little legislative history on the exemption in RCRA. But see H.R. REP.
No. 94-1491, at 67 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6305 ("[The Presidential
exemption provision] authorizes the President ... to grant an exemption to any facility or
activity of the federal government ... if the President ... determines that the national
security interests of the United States demands such exemption be made."). Of course,
reviewing the Area 51 interpretation from a textualist approach is a task made easier by
the general dislike for legislative history by such textualists as Scalia. See generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENrr L. REV. 365, 372 (1990); Breyer,
supra note 58, at 862-63; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1307 n.50 (1990).
66. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 523-24 ("Knowing that courts will follow
only their plain language, legislators will have an incentive to draft carefully and precisely.
Thus, by adopting formalism, courts help foster the democratic process. If Congress dis-
likes the results, it is always free to legislate again.").
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pretation leaves "judges free to bend law to 'intents' that are invented
more than they are discovered" and thereby make the judges "the real
authors of the rule."'67 Here, the district court correctly read the meaning
of Congress' intent to impose the national security exemption. 68 After
accepting this textual meaning of the law, however, the court then refused
to acknowledge the obvious displacement of a common law rule designed
for the same purpose. This rather convoluted effort would have failed
any honest textualist test. In United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co., the Supreme Court stressed that "where the language of an enact-
ment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to
absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be
taken as the final expression of the meaning intended. '69 In this litiga-
tion, no absurd consequences resulted from the preemption of a common
law rule that covers the same question as the statutory provision. The
Executive Branch was required by Congress to make public all exemp-
tions from federal law-a commendable and unburdensome task. The
alternative finding of an intent to create an exemption system while per-
mitting the circumvention of any enforcement of that system is precisely
the type of absurd result that textualists fear.70
The Frost decision does little better under an intentionalist or a
purposivist theory. These theories tether the court's interpretative role to
fulfilling the majoritarian decision of the legislature. Intentionalists view
the act of statutory interpretation as not simply giving force to the textual
language, but also to the intent of Congress in crafting the statute.71 To
achieve this end, various sources eschewed by textualists are embraced by
intentionalists. Such leading intentionalist scholars as Daniel Farber and
67. Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easter-
brook, J.)
68. Cf Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752
(1995) (noting that judges will occasionally use textual justifications in statutes that do not
reveal a "plain meaning" or reveal a meaning "universally believed" to be the opposite). ;
see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1546, 1549 (1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term - Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 77-78 (1994). The
imposition of a jurispathic common law rule is sometimes facilitated by ignoring plain
meaning to inject a needed ambiguity into a statute and thereby avoid implied preemption.
69. 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also 2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1144
(tentative ed. 1958); cf. The Right Honorable Lord Renton, The Interpretation of Statutes, 9
J. LEGIS. 252, 254 (1982) (pursuant to "ut res magis valeat quam pereat, it should be as-
sumed that Parliament intended to achieve something and not to produce a nullity; there-
fore, if there is more than one possible interpretation, that which makes the provision
effective should be followed.") (quoted in Martineau, supra note 60, at 8).
70. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is a venerable principle that a law will not be
interpreted to produce absurd results.").
71. Before he shifted his view of statutory interpretation, Judge Richard Posner ar-
gued for an intentionalist approach that he called "imaginative reconstruction." Compare
RICHARD A. POSNER, THm FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985) [herein-
after POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS], with Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Inter-
pretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REv. 431, 446 (1989).
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Philip Frickey advocate the incorporation of such sources as legislative
history to articulate the legislative intent behind a statute.72 Likewise,
Judge Posner argues that a court must construe a statute in light of the
court's judgment as to how Congress "would have wanted the statute ap-
plied to the case."'73 As an originalist theory, intentionalism shares the
concern of textualism that courts carry out congressional mandates.
While intentionalists treat the text as the most significant, however, it is
not the only source for divining that mandate. An intentionalist ap-
proach to the interpretation of RCRA would find overwhelming evidence
of Congress's intent to create a public process of reporting and exemption
of federal facilities. In both its legislative history and its structure, RCRA
was designed as a comprehensive system of reporting with specific provi-
sions for federal facilities. By creating a basis to exempt such facilities on
national security grounds, there is little mystery as to the original inten-
tion of Congress. The dismissal of the action against the military on na-
tional security grounds directly circumvented this intent without any
attention to its consequences for future enforcement of the Act.
An alternative approach to statutory interpretation is the use of the
perceived statute's purpose to assist in gap-filling or resolution of ambi-
guities.74 This purposivist approach may actually differ from the original
intent of the statute to capture the contemporary meaning of a provision
in light of the intended goals of the Congress at the time of enactment.
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in many ways epitomize this approach by
arguing that courts should construe statutes under the assumption that
Congress intended to achieve "reasonable purposes reasonably. ' 75 A
more recent variation on this theme can be found in Jonathan Macey's
work in which statutory gaps are filled with the "public-regarding pur-
pose" of the statute.76 While Macey recognizes that public choice criti-
ques of hidden dealing may have merit, he advocates this express
purposive approach to a statute to frustrate hidden bargains that would
otherwise be given effect under a dualist approach like Easterbrook's. 77
Macey's approach is particularly well-suited for litigation like Area 51.
The public-regarding purpose of RCRA's citizen suit provisions and dis-
closure/exemption provision is clear. Congress enacted the national se-
curity exemption to create a uniform system of compliance for federal
facilities, including a public annual disclosure of exempted facilities by
the President. The thrust of this process is a fully informed public and a
fully accountable chief executive. The court's interpretation preserving
72. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1988) (advocating a "flexible, pragmatic approach" that gives "legis-
lative intent ... an important role").
73. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 71, at 287.
74. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION, 25-34 (1994).
75. HART & SACKS, supra note 69, at 1415.
76. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
77. See supra note 5.
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the use of the state secrets privilege (and its absolute application in this
case) soundly defeats that goal. Yet, the court did not attempt to offer an
alternative "purpose" to explain why Congress would first mandate an-
nual reporting but not assume that common law rules to the contrary
would give way to the federal statute. Such a result does not serve any
public-regarding purpose since the Executive Branch is under no duty
beyond informing the public of the decisions of its President to waive
environmental protections or provisions. National security values are
clearly part of the statute to the extent that they are accommodated by a
provision allowing for unquestioned presidential exemption of federal fa-
cilities. This trade-off between national security and environmental val-
ues is a quintessential legislative function.
The Frost case could have presented a unique forum for any one of a
variety of interpretative theories. Scholars like Macey would have the
court seek the public-regarding purpose of a statute.78 Others like Cass
Sunstein would have the court consider "how statutory interpretation will
improve or impair the performance of governmental institutions. '79
However, under the common law approach, there was no "practical rea-
soning" 80 or dynamic interpretation;81 there was no "nautical" or "arche-
ological" approach.82 Theories of interpretation under the privilege are
only relevant to the limited extent of preemption. Thus, once the court
adopted a common law privilege designed to operate outside of the stat-
ute and its legislative values, these theories and the evolved function of
the statute became irrelevant.
The state secrets privilege is not an interpretative but a jurispathic de-
vice.83 Judges often begin such cases with the expectation that there are
simply some cases that cannot be tried due to the dangers of national
security. The common law in the national security area is viewed differ-
ently since it is linked conceptually to the survival of the political system.
Since national security is viewed as threatened by any disclosures in sensi-
tive areas, the courts maintain a certain cushion of protection for national
security agencies in the application of federal laws. By treating the state
secrets privilege as an "evidentiary rule," courts have effectively immu-
78. See Macey, supra note 76.
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 466 (1989).
80. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 468 (1988).
81. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479 (1987).
82. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REV.
20 (1988).
83. The privilege operates with all of the "violence" described by Robert Cover in his
influential work, Nomos and Narrative:
[Courts often work] to suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to
impose upon laws a hierarchy .... Because of the violence they command,
judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic
office. Confronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they
assert that this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the rest.
Cover, supra note 8, at 40, 60.
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nized the common law rule from anything but a direct legislative assault.
Since the rule theoretically goes only to the proof of a case, the basis of
an action is largely irrelevant to this application. This gives the adoption
of the privilege in any national security case the veneer of neutrality. A
court may largely avoid the confines of statutory interpretation by mov-
ing a determinative question outside the statute. As discussed below, this
was certainly the case with the Area 51 litigation.
B. PREEMPTION AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE USE OF COMMON LAW
AS AN OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE ELEMENT IN THE
FROST CASE
The common law privilege's affect on the statutory interpretation in the
Area 51 litigation is most evident in examining two insular issues: the
preemption of the privilege and the application of the privilege if not
preempted in the case. Both the district court and the court of appeals
agreed that the question of preemption of the common law was poten-
tially determinative in favor of the workers since the statute was clear as
to requirements for federal facilities. If the common law was preempted,
the statute's provisions would govern entirely. However, if the common
law was not preempted, the court could apply its requirements outside of
the statutory framework and determine if the action could be sustained
once the needs of the privilege are met. Accordingly, the decision to pre-
serve the privilege and to apply it in an absolute form in Frost warrants
closer attention. A preemption question at its most fundamental level
presents a court with the choice between resolving a dispute within or
without a statutory framework. Both the trial and appellate courts cor-
rectly noted that the only question related to the preemption of the state
secrets doctrine was the clarity of the statute.
Outside the national security area, the preemption issue presented in
the Area 51 case would be a simple matter for most courts when inter-
preting the statute. The state secrets privilege is a federal common law
evidentiary privilege.84 All federal common law is subject to "the para-
mount authority of Congress. 85 Courts resort to federal common law
only in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress.8 6 The standard that
applies to the preemption of federal common law is much lower than the
standard that applies to the preemption of state law.8 7 Unlike the deter-
84. See In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Frost 1, 161 F.R.D. at
437.
85. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931).
86. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
87. See id. at 366-67. The displacement of state law raises a host of federal questions
that are simply not present in a case of federal common law. Paul Lund explains:
When a federal court acts unilaterally to "displace" governing state law .... it
runs headlong into substantial federalism and separation of powers objec-
tions . . . [while] [t]hese same concerns .. .do not arise when federal law
governs by congressional direction that calls upon the federal courts to fill in
the contours of federal law in accordance with congressionally adopted
policy.
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mination of whether federal law preempts state law, which requires a
clear and manifest congressional purpose to preempt state law, "the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the statute 'speaks directly to the question' other-
wise answered by federal common law."'88
The application of the privilege to a command and control statute is
problematic only to the extent that the command and control statute in-
corporates a process that overlaps with the common law privilege.89 Ob-
viously, if a statute does not speak to such disclosure as part of its overall
regulatory scheme, the privilege is certainly a relevant and worthy matter
for judicial construction. Unlike laws like FOIA, however, command and
control statutes tend to be comprehensive in mandating both citizen suits
and the public disclosure of information. 90 Both citizen enforcement and
the public disclosure of information are viewed as core, not collateral,
purposes of such laws as RCRA.
In enacting RCRA, Congress codified an absolute privilege, or exemp-
tion, for the President and spoke directly to the question of national se-
curity claims over RCRA regulatory material.91 Faced with the
likelihood that sensitive facilities would be regulated under the Act, Con-
gress codified the use of both a Presidential declaration and an absolute
privilege under the Federal Facilities Provision. 92 Congress specifically
enacted the Federal Facility Compliance Act 93 to compel government
agencies to comply with the same laws imposed on private companies.
The national security exemption allowed the President to avoid any re-
sponsibilities for annual periods with an express statement under the fed-
eral law. Faced with the likelihood that sensitive facilities would be
regulated under the Act, Congress codified the use of both a Presidential
exemption and an absolute privilege under the Federal Facilities Provi-
Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 958 (1996).
88. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1985) (quoting
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981)).
89. Under the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a court normally will draw
inference from the language and structure of the statute, such that "where a form of con-
duct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it
refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as ex-
clusions." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCION § 47.23, at
216 (5th ed. 1992).
90. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 326 (1981), the Supreme Court
noted the ability of courts to ignore the obvious breadth of a command and control statute
to "in effect ... 'write their own ticket' under the guise of federal common law."
91. See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1576 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that
the President had not granted an exemption to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and conclud-
ing that the military facility was fully subject to all RCRA provisions). Past efforts to read
similar exemptions into RCRA have also been rejected. See Solano Garbage Co. v. Che-
ney, 779 F. Supp. 477, 486 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (rejecting claim of Air Force that it can refuse
compliance with RCRA on national security grounds, noting "the statute only authorizes
the President to grant exemptions from compliance with federal, interstate, state, and local
requirements").
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994).




sion.94 Section 6961 expressly authorizes the president to exempt individ-
ual federal facilities when he deems such an exemption "to be in the
paramount interest of the United States."95
By structuring the decision in terms of the common law privilege as
opposed to the values or process contained in the command and control
statute, various competing public values were effectively circumvented.
In this case, the President chose not to file a national security exemption
with Congress for successive annual periods. This was done despite the
fact that the national security exemption has previously been used and
has been discussed by the courts as the method to protect national secur-
ity interests.96 In upholding the government's use of the privilege to cir-
cumvent an enforcement provision of RCRA, Judge Pro ruled that an
agency can defy federal law and then use a common law evidentiary privi-
lege to do what the law forbids: to excuse federal facilities from the full
application of RCRA without the issuance of a presidential exemption. 97
Not only does this violate the express language of the statute, but the
court's decision creates a practical shield from some citizen suit enforce-
ment98 and renders any opposition to summary judgment virtually impos-
sible in future cases. 99
What is interesting from a statutory interpretation standpoint is that
the court did not attempt to claim ambiguity as to the requirements of the
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).
95. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 67. ("[The Presidential exemption provi-
sion] authorizes the President ... to grant an exemption to any facility or activity of the
federal government ... if the President ... determines that the national security interests
of the United States demands such exemption be made.").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576 (noting that the President had
not granted an exemption to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and concluding that the military
facility was fully subject to all RCRA provisions); see also Solano Garbage Co., 779 F.
Supp. at 486 (rejecting Air Force claim that it can refuse compliance with RCRA on na-
tional security grounds, noting "the statute only authorizes the President to grant exemp-
tions from compliance with federal, interstate, state, and local requirements").
97. In his concurrence to the appellate decision, Judge Tashima specifically rejected
the majority's affirmance of the lower court's use of the privilege and agreed with the
workers that Congress fully provided a statutory mechanism for withholding such informa-
tion, 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). Unlike the determination of whether federal law preempts state
law, which requires a clear and manifest congressional purpose to preempt state law, "the
relevant inquiry is whether the statute 'speaks directly to the question' otherwise answered
by federal common law." County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 236-37 As noted by Judge
Tashima, the national security provision of RCRA is virtually identical to the common law
privilege and preempts the privilege as to RCRA regulatory material: "Considering the
structure of RCRA as a whole, it is clear that Congress has 'spoken directly' to the ques-
tion of when and how information that is required by RCRA may be kept secret." Kasza
II, 133 F.3d at 1178. Tashima's view on preemption had one curious element. Tashima
would have prevented the government from using the state secrets privilege, yet he chose
to concur as opposed to dissent. This is difficult to reconcile with the record since the
entire basis for Pro's ruling in Frost was that he could not consider the underlying facts as
barred by the state secrets privilege.
98. Since the workers prevailed against the EPA, there is a basis upon which to bring
citizen suits against classified sites like Area 51. However, the court created a barrier as to
direct enforcement against the agencies operating such facilities.
99. Cf. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958) (noting "[u]nless Con-
gress has created rights which are completely illusory, existing only at the mercy of govern-
ment officials," executive privilege has its limitations in a democratic system).
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national security exemption. To the contrary, the court ordered compli-
ance with the provision in the Kasza case. The statutory interpretation
issue raised by the court was the perceived ambiguity in the congressional
intention to preempt a common law doctrine. Thus, according to the
court, the statute could be clear as to Congress' intent to force the Presi-
dent to comply with the national security exemption, but not clear in pre-
empting any common law doctrines that would interfere with that
obligation. By rejecting preemption, however, the court moved the case
outside of the statutory framework and the balancing of public values
inherent in any statutory interpretation. Once the court preserved the
common law doctrine in the litigation, however, it faced a second prob-
lem. The military insisted that any forced discovery of environmental
records, even the acknowledgment of hazardous wastes visible from pub-
lic lands, would threaten national security. Accordingly, the state secrets
doctrine not only had to be preserved but extended to block the full
scope of the federal law.
C. THE ADOPTION OF AN ABSOLUTE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN
THE AREA 51 LITIGATION
If a federal common law rule can be applied by a federal court in a
regulated area, the next level of analysis for the court was to determine
the extent that such conflict can be allowed by the federal court. The
effect of a properly invoked claim of privilege is to exclude the informa-
tion from discovery or consideration by the court.' °° There are only a
handful of cases where courts have ruled that an entire subject matter is a
state secret.' 0 ' Rather, most cases have followed the guidelines created
in United States v. Reynolds'0 2 and applied the privilege only to those
items of discovery that are found to be state secrets and only to those
portions that cannot be disentangled from sensitive material. Of the
seven cases in which courts have found a subject matter to be a state
100. See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Since a claim of privilege
possesses the ability to subvert even the most meritorious of claims, the Supreme Court
has noted that it is a privilege that must not be lightly invoked by the government. See
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953); see also Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57. The Court
has specified the procedure to be followed by the government when it seeks to utilize the
privilege. In Reynolds, the Court stated that "[t]here must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual per-
sonal consideration by that officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8. As explained by the Court:
"the decision to object should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the
department, and that he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents
and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be
produced." Id. at 8 n.20 (quoting Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., (1942) A.C. 624, 638).
101. See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995); Bareford v.
General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1992); Zuckerbraun v. General
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1991); Bowles v. United States, 950 F.2d 154,
156 (4th Cir. 1991); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985);
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980); Bentzlin v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). None of these cases were reviewed by the Supreme Court.
102. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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secret, none were regulatory matters brought under a "command and
control" statute. Rather, six of the actions were tort cases in which a
private claim was barred because proof of the claim would have required
detailed discussion of the operating capabilities of classified weaponry or
intelligence operations. 10 3 The seventh case was a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) claim in which the workers sought the actual informa-
tion gathered under a surveillance. 104
In prior privilege cases, the common law was traditionally applied in
the absence of a statutory process to deal with conflict over national se-
curity information. In contrast, the Area 51 litigation involved an en-
forcement action brought under a "command and control statute"
enacted by Congress.10 5 Central to this command and control system are
the citizen enforcement provisions allowing citizens to act as "private at-
torney generals." Such citizen suit enforcement is particulary important
in the national security area where the government is the alleged violator
and has a history of poor self-regulation. To allow the Executive Branch
to claim an entire regulatory subject matter to be a state secret would
effectively negate the statutory scheme as it applied to national security
sites by circumventing the core enforcement mechanism.106
What made the Area 51 litigation a fascinating academic model was
not only the use of a common law privilege to defeat a clear statutory
source, but the additional use of the highly controversial "mosaic theory"
to effectively defeat any enforcement of the statutory provisions.
Throughout the litigation, the government repeatedly made reference to
a mosaic theory as the basis for withholding any discovery specifically
dealing with the regulatory status and any hazardous waste activities of
the facility in the past or the present. Under the government's theory,
innocuous and unclassified information can be a state secret if linked to
Area 51. Thus, according to the government, an item of information may
be individually unclassified, and even publicly known, but still a potential
103. See Black, 62 F.3d at 1118-19; Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143; Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at
547-48; Bowles, 950 F.2d at 156; Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1244; Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d
at 281; Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1496.
104. See Molerio, 749 F.2d at 820.
105. To achieve those purposes, Congress explicitly provided a means by which national
security interests were to be to protected and compliance with the statute was to be
achieved. Thus, as noted earlier, if a facility's compliance responsibilities are incompatible
with national security concerns, the president may annually exempt the facility so long as
he reports his decision to both the Congress and the public. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
106. Courts have recognized and protected legislative authority in past cases. See Hal-
pern, 258 F.2d at 43 (refusing to allow the state secrets privilege to serve as a basis for
dismissing a complaint after "Congress has created rights which it has authorized federal
district courts to try"). Congress enacted an enforcement system, supported by citizen
suits, for all federal facilities. Since this regulation applied to all federal facilities, Congress
enacted a national security exemption for the President to exclude any facility from com-
pliance under the Act. Thus, if a facility's status or activities are incompatible with compli-
ance or present unique problems for security, the President may annually exempt the
facility so long as he takes public responsibility for the decision to exempt. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961.
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danger due to a hypothetical combination with other facts. 10 7 The work-
ers challenged the use of this theory as both inherently abusive and in
direct conflict with the court-imposed restrictions on the use of the
privilege.10 8
The adoption of the mosaic theory allowed the court to remove the
dispute from the context of the statute and its countervailing public val-
ues. Clearly, the application of the theory was not simply an "eviden-
tiary" matter, but went to the core of the enforcement process mandated
by Congress. The artificial separation of the evidentiary principle from
the context of the command and control statute served little more than an
outcome determinative purpose. Citizen suits are designed to facilitate
disclosure and compliance within a regulatory scheme. The superimposi-
tion of a common law rule of evidence that would defeat that scheme
should have prompted, at a minimum, some effort to accommodate the
conflicting public values in the statutory and common law authority. The
court's failure to limit the use of the mosaic theory is particularly troub-
107. This theory was first introduced in Defendants' Opposition to the First Motion to
Compel. The mosaic theory is also expressly mentioned in the Widnall Declaration as the
foundation for privilege assertions on some of the material requested in the case. In its
decisions denying discovery, the district court also refers to the theory as a basis for the
withholding of discovery. See Frost II, 919 F. Supp. at 1464-67. The Widnall Declaration
defined the mosaic theory as part of the critical classification section of the Declaration:
Security Classification: Under Information Security Oversight Office gui-
dance, "[clertain information that would otherwise be unclassified may re-
quire classification when combined or associated with other unclassified
information." (32 CFR 2001.3(a)). Protection through classification is re-
quired if the combination of unclassified items of information provides an
added factor that warrants protection of the information taken as a whole.
This theory of classification is commonly known as the mosaic or compilation
theory. The mosaic theory of classification applies to some of the informa-
tion associated with the operating location near Groom Lake. Although the
operating location near Groom Lake has no official name, it is sometimes
referred to by the name or names of programs that have been conducted
there. The names of some programs are classified; all program names are
classified when they are associated with the specific location or with other
classified programs. Consequently, the release of any such names would dis-
close classified information.
Frost 1, 161 F.R.D. at 436 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Widnall Declaration specifies that the mosaic theory applies only to some infor-
mation relating to the facility, and not, as the government claims, all information related to
the facility.
108. As a legal matter, the "mosaic theory" would lead to a negation of past protections
against exaggerated or tactical uses of the privilege. According to the government, it is
immaterial which items are sought since any item could be part of a mosaic, even an admis-
sion as to the presence of buildings or sandy soil at this facility. Despite the limitations
noted in the Widnall Declaration, the government persuaded the district court that virtu-
ally all information, even generic information such as the presence of jet fuel, plastics and
pesticides at this facility, falls within the scope of the Widnall Declaration. This included
the refusal to admit that jet fuel existed at an Air Force base (with a runway, aircraft and
fueling trucks visible from public lands). Obviously, the mosaic theory would be unim-
peachable since it suggests that even the most innocuous information can be withheld to
avoid the danger of combination with other facts. This would render meaningless such
requirements as disentanglement in past privilege cases. See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57.
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ling in areas of generic regulatory information.10 9 The most obvious is
the confirmation or denial of the existence of "hazardous wastes" at the
facility. 110 The workers noted that most of the critical claims made in this
case would have been established by the simple confirmation of hazard-
ous wastes, as an ubiquitous regulatory term. In the very least, such a
confirmation would have allowed the district court to grant declaratory
judgment in favor of the workers on the failure to properly inventory and
permit the facility. Even if the court refused to order the release of spe-
cific regulatory information or generic waste stream information, this one
fact would have allowed the workers to establish the regulatory status of
the facility and thereby give limited meaning to the Act's public account-
ability purposes. The use of the common law in the statutory area effec-
tively reduces the showing of the government to a statement of rout
generality with literally infinite potential in any case.
The desire to impose a jurispathic result appeared so great in the case
that the court simply ignored the fact that, during the litigation, defend-
ants had released some of the very information the court claimed to be
privileged. In public filings, the government openly discussed the com-
pletion of a hazardous waste inventory for Area 51 and also made a
promise not to violate RCRA in the future by allowing hazardous waste
inspections to occur and conducting future hazardous waste inventories.
The military also stated that Area 51 would be placed on the Federal
Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket, which only lists facilities where
hazardous wastes are currently or ever have been stored, treated or dis-
posed of at the facility."' The workers argued that this information, cou-
pled with Browner's admission that a hazardous waste inventory had
never been performed for Area 51, constituted prima facie evidence that
defendants had violated RCRA and were liable as to count one in
109. The generic term "hazardous wastes" applies to literally thousands of different
wastes, including basic solvents or paints, and would convey the same regulatory status as
hundreds of thousands of different businesses and facilities. It places Area 51 in the same
category as George Washington University, Burger Kings and Jiffy Lubes.
110. Another obvious example of the mosaic theory gone wild was the government's
claim of privilege with regard to one of the workers' requests for admission concerning the
presence of any threatened or endangered species in the vicinity of the facility. The gov-
ernment claimed that this admission, which would only establish legal status under an Act
with hundreds of species, would endanger American lives. The Air Force openly discusses
one such species, the desert tortoise, as present in the area of the facility in the Nellis
Range. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATURAL RESOURCES-DEFENSE AND
INTERIOR CAN BETTER MANAGE LAND WITHDRAWN FOR MILITARY USE, Apr. 26, 1994
(GAO/NSIAD-94-87) (discussing the Air Force and the desert tortoise in Nevada).
111. The Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket provides in relevant
part:
Section 120(c) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) ... requires the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a Federal Agency Hazardous Waste
Compliance Docket. The docket is to contain certain information about Fed-
eral facilities that manage hazardous waste or from which hazardous sub-
stances have been or may be released.
Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,474 (1995).
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Frost.12
This is not to suggest that all courts applying the common law privilege
would adopt such an extreme view as the court in Frost. The common
law can reflect alternative public values and the imposition of a common
law privilege does not forestall a court's balancing of such interests. The
national security privileges tend to invite less balancing of interests but,
even in these cases, some balancing is encouraged. A review of past cases
indicates the rare circumstances in which courts have found entire subject
matters to be state secrets. 1 3 These cases involved the disclosure of spe-
cific facts on the capabilities of weapons systems or the actual identities
of agents. Other cases also involved private actions brought under tort or
contract and not regulatory enforcement provisions."14 None of these
cases suggested the type of sweeping application seen in the Frost case
with a command and control statute.
The Area 51 litigation shows how the gravitational pull of national se-
curity can warp the analysis and easily deprive the litigants of any mean-
ingful balancing of interests. Since the privilege is ultimately a
discretionary device held by the court, the degree of balancing can be
quite inconsistent and haphazard. In contrast to the prior cases, the
workers in the Area 51 litigation sought information regarding the regu-
112. The workers argued that the government's confirmation of their performance of
these regulatory duties constitutes substantive evidence that hazardous waste is, or has
been stored, treated, or disposed of at Area 51. Other circuits have found that conduct
performed pursuant to a federal environmental statute may be used as substantive evi-
dence in proving a violation of that statute. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993). Rather than address this contradiction, the
court of appeals wholly ignored these facts and affirmed the finding of the entire subject
matter, including an identical count discussed publicly in Kasza, to be a state secret.
113. See Black, 62 F.3d at 1117-18 (negligence, assault and battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress case where proof of claims required information concerning the iden-
tities of government agents and the locations of contacts with those agents); Fitzgerald, 776
F.2d at 1243 (where the underlying action was a libel suit and the proof required to prove
or refute the claim involved whether the Navy was using marine mammals for military and
intelligence purposes); Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1142 (manufacturing and design defect case
requiring information on capabilities of a secret U.S. missile system as well as data on the
design, manufacture, performance, and functional characteristics and testing of the missile
systems); Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547 (tort action involving same underlying facts as in
Bareford); Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1497 (manufacturing defect case where information
necessary to prove and refute claims involved classified information on Maverick missile
capabilities, tactics employed by U.S. aircraft, and military orders during the Gulf War).
114. Six of these cases were tort actions in which a private claim was barred because
proof of the claim would have required detailed discussion of the operating capabilities of
classified weaponry or intelligence operations. See Black, 62 F.3d at 1118; Bareford, 973
F.2d at 1143; Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547-48; Bowles, 950 F.2d at 156; Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d
at 1244; Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d at 281; Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1496. The seventh
case was a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) claim in which the plaintiffs sought the
actual information gathered under surveillance. See Molerio, 749 F.2d at 819. In these
cases, courts found dismissal of the actions to be appropriate because "sensitive military
secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed
will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters." Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1241-42. These
courts looked to the nature of the proof required to establish or refute the claims
presented and determined that such proof would disclose sensitive military or intelligence
information. In contrast, the workers' case in Frost sought information regarding the regu-
latory status of the facility.
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
latory status of the facility 1 5 and did not require proof that specific types
of hazardous wastes were ever stored, treated, or disposed of at Groom
Lake facility. Instead, the workers' claims required evidence that any
type of "hazardous waste," in a generic sense, is or had been stored,
treated, or disposed of at the facility. Even if the court found that some
claims require specific information that is sensitive, it is obviously exces-
sive to claim that the entire regulatory subject matter is a state secret.1 6
There is no reason for the President to use such exemption provisions if,
when detected, the government can avoid enforcement provisions by
claiming the entirety of the regulatory subject matter as a state secret.
The mosaic theory allows a court to achieve what Congress and the Court
have expressly forbidden: an absolute claim of privilege that avoids the
procedures of Reynolds and negates the express national security provi-
sion of RCRA.117 It is also the most powerful vehicle for the common
law to superimpose judicial discretion over legislative authority in the
statutory area. As such, it comes with costs that easily dwarf the insular
interests of any dispute in litigation.
115. Likewise, the court of appeals failed to address one of the central arguments
against finding the entire subject matter of this case to be a state secret: the prior litigation
of the same injuries at the same facility in a workers compensation hearing of one of the
parties in the case. The workers compensation hearing considered, on the merits, the inju-
ries of Mr. Robert Frost, who is represented in these cases by his widow, Helen Frost. That
hearing dealt with the same injuries alleged in these cases and the alleged burning of haz-
ardous wastes at the same facility. With the Air Force present to monitor security at the
public hearing, the government contractor and employees were allowed to refer to the
relevant facility as "Area 51" and discuss the underlying merits of the case.
116. The underlying premise upon which the government has claimed that the entire
subject matter of this suit is a state secret is that Area 51 contains highly sensitive, classi-
fied operations. Recognizing the reality of this fact did not diminish the workers' argu-
ments that certain regulatory information can still be disclosed. The nation's other
classified facilities stand as an example of this fact. For example, the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory complies with RCRA by noting that it has hazardous wastes as do the
Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, White Sands Missile Range, DOE's Oak Ridge Na-
tional Laboratory and DOE's Y-12 Plant. See Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compli-
ance Docket, 53 Fed. Reg. 4284 (1988) Classified locations not only acknowledge
hazardous waste but disclose waste stream information, including the Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory, the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security
Agency.
117. The adoption of an absolute mosaic theory represents a significant departure from
previously accepted procedures employed in the application of the state secrets privilege to
withhold information in federal cases. In response to the "serious potential for defeating
worthy claims for violations of rights that would otherwise be proved," In re United States,
872 F.2d at 476, the D.C. Circuit requires that the relevancy of the government's assertion
of the privilege must be determined on an item-by-item basis. See Northrop Corp. v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Molerio, 749 F.2d at 821. The
only situations where an item-by-item review of withheld information is not required is
where the entire subject matter of the suit is a state secret. See Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1142.
However, in such a case, the agency head responsible for the information must still review
the kind of information that would necessarily be involved in proving or refuting the case
and then, after such review, determine that the kind of information involved in proving or
refuting the case poses a reasonable danger to the nation's security. See id. at 1141; see also
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8; Black, 62 F.3d at 1117; Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1142; Zuckerbraun,
935 F.2d at 547; Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 55 n.15; Halkin v. Helms, 690 F. 2d 977, 991 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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IV. THE LEGISPRUDENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND
THE COMMON LAW
All statutory interpretation is on some level a form of dialogue be-
tween the judicial and legislative branches. For some positivists, this dia-
logue can be highly abbreviated and confined. For some civic republican
scholars, this dialogue is more robust and fluid.118 Regardless of the un-
derlying model or theory, the tripartite system anticipates a dynamic rela-
tionship between those who make the laws and those who interpret it.
These models are often tested in a classic case of an ambiguous statute
with a gap in its language. The question for the court is the extent to
which it should advance the purpose of a statute in the absence of a clear
textual mandate. The dialogue that occurs in this circumstance is the in-
terplay between congressional commands and judicial construction.
When academics advance theories for "up-dating" or "gap-filling" in stat-
utory interpretation, therefore, the interpretive question is considered
and resolved in a single statutory context.
A second and different form of dialogue occurs when the statutory in-
terpretation involves a secondary extrinsic source. When a court must
consider two sources-statutory and common law-two voices are heard
on a given subject. While other cases are confined to the disagreement
over the translation of congressional intent as stated through a statute,
the coexistence of statutory and common law authority requires a court
to listen to the voice of Congress while considering any dissonance in the
voice of prior common law decisions. In cases of clarity, common law
must give way to the statute, as should have been the case in Area 51.
However, where the two authorities can be reconciled, a unique moment
exists where the court is forced to perform a dialogic role under a model
of legisprudence. Even if the court considers a privilege to be un-
preempted, the court has the opportunity to reconcile the public values
advanced by both the statutory and common law sources.1 9 As opposed
to adopting the all-or-nothing approach of Frost, the court could have
resolved the conflict between the sources by applying the privilege while
limiting its application to achieve legislative values. Specifically, the
court could have required admissions or denials under the generic term of
"hazardous waste" while allowing the government to withhold the spe-
cific identification of the materials at the facility. This would have ad-
vanced the public notice and deterrent elements of RCRA while
accommodating national security interests of the government. While this
was not the preferred approach of the workers, such a moderate ap-
proach would have allowed for the application of a common law doctrine
118. Civic republicanism posits that the legislative process ideally transforms insular
views into a majoritarian compromise. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republi-
can Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); see also Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional
Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DuKE L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Turley,
Senate Trials].
119. To again borrow from Cover, this can be expressed as the difference between ajurispathic and jurisgenerative approach. See Cover, supra notes 8 & 83.
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within the context of a statutory framework. Such compromises allow
courts to serve as unique forums for the balancing of public values. Most
importantly, as will be shown below, it avoids the legislative costs associ-
ated with the jurispathic role of privilege like the state secrets privilege.
A. THE DIALOGIC EFFECT OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE AREA OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The application of legisprudence theories to common law privileges at
first blush may seem oxymoronic. Legisprudence is most commonly fo-
cused on the statutory source and the impact of gap-filling through the
extension of statutory purposes. The common law component of these
cases is relatively ignored in favor of the more concrete issues relating to
the legislation and its meaning. This emphasis is understandable since
common law is obviously developed outside of the legislative process and
thus outside the core interests of legisprudence. Yet, the use of common
law in conjunction with a statutory source raise unique legisprudential
issues. 120 There has been renewed interest in the common law authority
of the courts in the face of the statutory onslaught of this Century.121
Guido Calabresi's book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,122 ad-
dressed the dwindling role of common law. After what Calabresi calls an
"orgy of statute making,"'1 23 he suggests that there is a greater need for
courts to exercise common law authority to disregard statutes as "obso-
lete." Calabresi's book was controversial precisely because he saw the
role of common law as checking or correcting the majority determina-
tions made in legislation, based on a judge's view that the laws are now
"anachronistic" 124 or out of step with contemporary values. In some re-
spects, Calabresi is simply being more candid in his view of the role of
courts, which often produce the same results by subterfuge.
The Area 51 litigation, however, raises the question not of anachronis-
120. One of the most direct forms of dialogue was apparently advocated by Jeremy
Bentham who suggested that "courts could send the legislature a statement explaining its
broad reading of a statute and proposing that the statute be amended to effect that read-
ing." Robert Weisberg, Essay, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 227 n.53 (1983) (citing J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL
241 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970) (1782)).
121. Of course, the interest in the common law vis-A-vis statutory authority has been a
mainstay of legal analysis. Richard Posner, for example, has long suggested that common
law is naturally inclined toward efficient rules where statutory sources are often based on
inefficient legislative exchanges or impulses. This efficiency inclination of the common law
has been challenged. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selec-
tion of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); see also Maxwell L. Steams, Restoring
Positive Law and Economics: Introduction to Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 709, 716-17 (1998).
122. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
123. Id. at 73 ("The orgy of statute making has not occurred by chance, even if its total
effect has been to an extraordinary degree unintended and unselfconscious."). Calabresi
insists that the rapid pace of "statutorification ... is the best argument against thinking we
can reverse the trend." Id. at 79.
124. See id. at 2.
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tic statutes but anachronistic common law.125 The role of the common
law in the age of statutes has been a matter of some debate, inspired in
part by Calabresi's impressive work. Yet, in this debate, the common law
can be presented as more monolithic or homogenous than it is. Before
common law is embraced as a force for modernization or moderation,
greater attention must be given to the variety of common law principles
that come into play in statutory cases. Some common law privileges ap-
pear resistant to change and reflect a long-standing view of the bench as
opposed to society at large. Common law evolves at the same pace as the
evolution of judicial tastes or perspectives. Perhaps for this reason, while
common law tends to evolve at a fair pace in areas like tort, common law
rules in the area of national security appear more static and non-evolu-
tionary. This is particularly the case with the state secrets privilege.
As noted earlier, the state secrets privilege reflects a common rule that
was developed for both a different time and a different context than that
raised in the Area 51 litigation. Conflicts with the state secrets privilege
arise in three basic ways. First, most of the cases involve a private litigant
seeking tort or contractual relief from another private party or a federal
agency.126 Some of these cases arise under statutes allowing recovery for
actions by the government or its contractors. Second, some cases may
arise under statutes such as FOIA, which allow citizens to seek informa-
tion or disclosures from the government. 127 Third, there are citizen suit
actions, the first being the Area 51 litigation, in which information is
sought under the auspices of a command and control statute. Each of
these cases raises significantly different institutional and constitutional
questions.
The state secrets doctrine was primarily developed under the pressure
of the first category of cases, where the government intervened to prevent
the disclosure of information harmful to the United States. In such cases,
the common law privilege was needed to address unforeseen and danger-
ous circumstances where litigation would force the revelation of a fact
inimical to the national interest. The second category of cases involve
federal statutes, such as FOIA, that not only authorize an action but can
also produce threats of unforeseen disclosure. FOIA is an area in which
the privilege is less relevant given the ample authority to withhold sensi-
tive information under the Act. Nevertheless, in the progress of litiga-
tion, the privilege has been used to bar discovery that would threaten
125. The decision in Frost also raises a question of judicial candor. The court's formal-
istic response in Frost appeared driven by an outcome-determinative intent by the court
and not a fundamental theory of interpretation or legislative supremacy. The court was
clearly hostile to the notion that environmental standards would be imposed on the mili-
tary at a classified site. Yet, the court was unwilling to question the judgment of Congress
and instead chose a neutral vehicle like the privilege to deny the requirements of the Act.
The need for greater judicial candor in such decision remains a matter of academic debate.
See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
126. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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national security.128 FOIA should represent the furtherest extreme of
the application of the privilege to a statutory case given the Act's express
interest in protecting sensitive information from disclosure. The Area 51
litigation falls in the final category of cases brought under a command
and control statute. It is in this third area that the privilege should have
the greatest scrutiny in its application when faced with both citizen suit
provisions and information forcing provisions. Moreover, when applied,
the privilege should be construed narrowly to tailor any common law in-
fluence to the legislative program.
Before creating the choice between the common law and the statutory
scheme, the court in Frost did not question the continued viability of the
common law rule in a command and control area. While Calabresi advo-
cated such a query in the case of an outdated statute, there is rarely such
an inquiry in the selection of a common law privilege in national security
litigation. This may be due to the fact that the privilege creates a problem
of judicial competence that yields readily to the opinion of the Executive
Branch agencies. 129 Since the privilege rests on a judgment by the agency
of classification or sensitivity, the courts generally defer to such judgment
and reaffirm both the privilege's application and scope in a given case.
Moreover, because the privilege is based on a perceived area of near ab-
solute executive power, courts do not treat the privilege as potentially
out-dated because the area is reviewed as static and largely non-evolu-
tionary. The privilege has continued to be applied despite the massive
shift toward statutory schemes and regulation. Yet, given their role in the
creation of the privilege, the courts are the forum in which such a review
should ideally take place, distinct from any question of preemption under
particular command and control statutes. It is in this forum that the
scope of any unpreempted privilege can be debated and balanced within
the context of a command and control law.
The superimposition of common law over statutory authority naturally
leads to a comparison of the costs in resolving disputes in the context of
statutory law as opposed to common law. If common law is used to avoid
or circumvent a statutory process, it is reasonable to inquire into the rela-
tive advantage to society in having a resolution found in a common law
rather than a statutory framework. Unlike the conventional statutory in-
terpretation model, the use of a secondary extrinsic source like a common
law privilege interjects a public value formed outside the open and delib-
erative process of the legislative branch. This emphasis comes at some
obvious costs. Common law doctrines are created by judicial officers who
are neither subject to popular will nor necessarily in agreement with
majoritarian values. For example, the court in Frost reflected a strong
128. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Linder v. Department of Defense, 133 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Be-
cause judges 'have little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence gather-
ing,' courts must give 'great deference' to the Director of Central Intelligence's
determination that a classified document could reveal intelligence sources and methods
and endanger national security.") (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176, 179 (1985)).
[Vol. 53
THROUGH A LOOKING GLASS DARKLY
personal view of national security requirements in adopting the most ex-
treme possible interpretation of state secrets and an absolute mosaic the-
ory to dismiss the case.
While both the common law privilege and the statute represent public
values, they were created by vastly different processes and are not neces-
sarily equal in their claim of authority in a given conflict. Despite its
limitations, as described by the public choice school, the legislative pro-
cess exposes most major statutes to a vast array of competing interests
and values. Common law, on the other hand, is developed by the least
representative branch and often is univocal or narrow in its purpose.
Where RCRA was developed through the compromise of governmental
and private interests in a vast array of areas, the state secrets privilege
was developed with the narrow perspective of Article III courts in dealing
with national security litigation. The state secrets privilege was devel-
oped at a time when most modem national policies, such an environ-
mentalism, were hardly recognized. Since the state secrets privilege is
motivated by a single univocal value-the protection of national security
secrets-it is unaffected by the changes in society as to the equally com-
pelling value of environmental protection or worker safety or other pub-
lic policies. Where statutes tend to evolve with time through periodic
amendments, privileges like the state secrets privilege evolve at a glacial
pace, if at all. As society has changed, the privilege continues to enforce
its univocal purpose without reference to the possible elevation of some
values above secrecy or national security values. Thus, where scholars
like Ronald Dworkin have suggested that interpretation should be like
the writing of a chain novel with judges as successor authors, 130 the privi-
lege simply mandates a sudden ending to any statutory novel without de-
velopment or continuity with the preceding chapters.
Another problem often considered in the legislative context is the dan-
ger of agency capture in the enforcement of federal laws. There is an
analogous danger of capture in the common law context when dealing
with national security cases. Federal judges applying the privilege are ex-
posed to a relatively rare process of in camera, ex parte review of infor-
mation presented as extremely classified and sensitive. This privileged
exposure to national security information can have a distortive effect on
judges.131 Judges are suddenly initiated into a secret world that few citi-
zens are allowed to witness. These meetings come with all of the trap-
pings of high security. National security figures convey a level of trust
upon the judge in a relationship that expressly excludes the plaintiffs or
their counsel. The most extreme form of this danger of capture can be
found in the proceedings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
130. .See RONALD DWOaKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313 (1986).
131. See Area 51: Catch 22, supra note 19 (statement of Rep. Lee Hamilton, former
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee on Judge Pro's rulings in the Area 51 litiga-
tion, calling the military's claims "unsubstantiated" and noting that "judges are often
snowed by the national security establishment" in such claims.).
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(FISA). 132 This secret court handles applications for domestic intercept
and surveillance by the national security agencies. 133 Judges meet with
agency officials in a highly secure environment, or Special Compartmen-
talized Intelligence Facility (SCIF) protected from interception or moni-
toring. Their very environment, therefore, is supplied and maintained by
the regulated agencies. The court is composed of a relatively small
number of judges, often senior status judges, who become an active part
of on-going espionage and intelligence operations. It is not surprising
that this court has only turned down a single application out of tens of
thousands in its existence.134 The FISA court, however, is only a more
extreme form of the capture that occurs in individual national security
cases. 135 Unlike the FISA judges who at least see a steady stream of na-
tional security cases, most judges meeting secretly on privilege cases are
uninitiated members of the judiciary who are subject to impressive secur-
ity precautions and the protestations of sensitivity in these meetings. This
is not to say that judges cannot resist such influences or maintain their
independence. The use of such a judicial officer to balance the interests
of the public and the government is inevitable in some cases but hardly
preferable to a process laid out in a command and control statute by Con-
gress. The increased role of the judges under the privilege only increases
the possibility of capture and bias. A command and control law like
RCRA obtained public support in part on the promise that the reporting
and exemption system would be part of a public and largely nondiscre-
tionary process. The involvement of the court creates the opportunity for
subterfuge by the government despite the basic guarantees under the Act.
Finally, the use of the common law can help insulate issues from both
public debate and legislative correction. In the national security area,
when common law is used to circumvent a -statutory source, a court
removes the conflicts of values from a highly evolutionary and demo-
cratic process to a more static and elitist process.136 While common law is
clearly evolutionary in most areas, national security privileges tend to be
more static and, as noted above, more univocal. This comes at a cost to
the legislative process and the concept of informed consent of the gov-
132. See 50 U.S.C. § 1821(5) (1994).
133. The Author witnessed the functions of this secret court first hand as an employee
of the National Security Agency during the Reagan Administration.
134. See Benjamin Wittes, Inside America's Most Secretive Court, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
19, 1996, at 1.
135. See Jonathan Turley, Black-Bag Justice, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 28 (criti-
cizing the FISA court).
136. Obviously, under a dynamic interpretative viewpoint, the evolutionary potential of
a statute is based in part on judicial construction over the course of many years or social
changes. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 68, at 62 ("Statutory text never antici-
pates all the issues that the statute will have to address, and over time the unresolved issues
will multiply when social circumstances change and the political-legal equilibrium shifts.").
"The statute 'means' nothing until it takes its place in the legal system, until it begins to
interact with judges, lawyers, administrators, and lay people." Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at
57.
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erned.137 It is more likely that a judicial interpretation of a statutory pro-
vision will be corrected than the case-by-case application of a national
security privilege. Since these cases have very narrow application to a
small group of injured parties, most such cases are rarely noticed by the
public or Congress. The information and transactional costs are in-
creased; increasing the cost of legislative action. The absence of rent-
seeking pressures only further diminishes the interest of Congress to act
in such cases.' 38
Ironically, the problem identified by Calabresi in the explosion of stat-
utory sources is also the reason why the superimposition of the common
law will often go uncorrected by the legislature. Congress is now faced
with so many different statutes that corrective acts are relatively rare.
Certainly, individual case decisions imposing the common law privilege
are unlikely to draw the attention of the relevant House or Senate Com-
mittees absent strong interests. Such interests may be present in areas at
the heart of public choice scholarship with high levels of rent-seeking or
wealth transfers. As will be shown below, such is not the case in the na-
tional security area. As a result, the judicial imposition of the common
law not only cuts off dialogue in the courts but practically cuts off dia-
logue in the political system as a whole.
B. THE LEGISPRUDENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS AND
THE COST OF JUDICIAL NEGATION OR CIRCUMVENTION
The superimposition of the common law in an area of command and
control regulation raises concerns over the forces that influence and
maintain common law privileges. A separate concern, however, is raised
when such superimposition occurs in the area of national security law.
One common thread among legisprudence theories is the need to tie any
theory of statutory interpretation to an underlying theory of separation of
powers and Article III power. The common problem of most such arti-
cles focuses on private interests and their role on the language of legisla-
tion. The premise of the Madisonian democracy is that the legislative
process allows for disparate factions to engage in an open and delibera-
tive fashion to reach majoritarian compromises.' 39 Such purposivists as
137. This creates a "falsified consent" problem. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative His-
tory Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1999). "Democracy is legitimate only if people vote or
otherwise consent based on their true preferences, rather than those manufactured by gov-
ernment manipulation of information." Id. at 20-21. See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 106 (1975) (discussing role of consent in democratic systems).
138. This is sharply different from the dynamics of statutory interpretation under a the-
ory like that of Jonathan Macey, discussed earlier. See supra notes 76, 78 and accompany-
ing text. Macey's theory of interpretation advances a statute's public-regarding purposes
and is designed to discourage hidden deals or to force open deliberation within the legisla-
tive process. Likewise, the other intentionalist, purposivist, and dynamic theories presup-
pose a type of dialogue between the courts and the legislature that occurs within the
context of a statute.
139. See generally UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d CONG.,
BIG GOVERNMENT LAwsuITs: ARE POLICY DRIVEN LAwsuITs IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
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Hart and Sacks based their interpretative views on this assumption and
the need to rely on the procedures of legislation to defeat special minor-
ity or opportunistic interests. 140 The public choice school raised compel-
ling arguments about the failure of the modem legislative process to force
such majoritarian results.141 In the age of special interest groups and lob-
bying, small groups with concentrated interests and benefits tend to do
better than large groups with distributed interests and benefits. This is
most troubling in the use of hidden special deals that occur away from the
open debate and the public view in shaping the language of statutes.
Often, the hidden deal is meant simply to add ambiguity to a statute to
protect an interest while maintaining the appearance of the public-re-
garding purpose of the statute.142 Thus, the question of much of the
scholarship in this area has been the proper role of courts as interpreters
in light of such deficiencies. Easterbrook and others advocate textualism
to leave the legislative market to its own devices and outcomes.' 43
Others, like Macey, advocate gap-filing to advance the stated (albeit at
times disingenuous) purpose of the statute. 144
All of these theories confront the problem of hidden deals and rent-
seeking with private or special interests in the legislative process.145 The
Executive Branch, of course, also lobbies for transfers of both power and
money from the legislative branch. 146 While not meeting the traditional
view of rent-seeking, 147 this conduct does produce the negative byproduct
of hidden deals. Executive branch officials will often negotiate and bar-
(Comm. Print 1990) (includes testimony of Professor Jonathan Thrley on the Madisonian
implications of federal governmental litigation in areas of controversy).
140. "Every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act. The idea of a
statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible."
HART & SACKS, supra note 69, at 1156.
141. See generally Tbrley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 6, at 354-65.
142. See id. at 356-57.
143. See supra notes 4 to 5 and accompanying text.
144. This public choice critique is part of a wider "family" of positive political theory
that share "a core general presumption that political behavior is to be explained as the
outcome of rational (and often strategic) actions by relevantly situated individuals within
some set of defined institutional boundaries." Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative
Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 267, 280 (1990) (quoted in Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive
Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 459 (1992)).
145. Rent-seeking is normally a term used in relation to private interests seeking
"rents" from Congress. This term is defined as "the resource-wasting activities of individu-
als in seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of the state." JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET
AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY ix (1980); see also CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 70(1990) (defining rent-seeking as "the dissipation of wealth through efforts to redistribute
resources by way of politics."). Macey defines rent-seeking as "the attempt to obtain eco-
nomic rents (i.e., payments for the use of an economic asset in excess of the market price)
through government intervention in the market." Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).
146. See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 245-59 (1993).
147. In the conventional public choice problem, the executive branch can actually re-
duce the advantages or costs of rent-seeking. Jonathan Macey explained:
[Vol. 53
THROUGH A LOOKING GLASS DARKLY
gain for changes in legislation. Where private interests may offer finan-
cial support for a legislator, the Executive branch can offer equally
concrete payment for its legislative gains from highways to military bases
to federal contracts. If such hidden deals do exist (a proposition that is in
little doubt), the question is whether we should be as concerned with hid-
den deals between Congress and agency interests as we are with hidden
deals between Congress and private special interests. The answer can be
found in a reexamination of the problem with hidden deals in a Madis-
onian democracy. The tripartite system is designed to forge consensus
from otherwise disparate factional groups. 148 By forcing open and delib-
erative debate, the bicameral and tripartite features of the Madisonian
democracy function to encourage majoritarian results. All hidden legisla-
tive deals, whether with private or public agents, are presumptively a neg-
ative influence on this system. 149 Of course, Congress may not have truly
meant what is said in RCRA and allowed the continuation of a privilege
that would defeat the stated purpose of the Act. This would be a particu-
larly extreme case of the use of deceptive public-regarding language to
conceal a hidden deal negating a right given to citizens vis-d-vis their
government.
Even assuming that there is no likely basis for a hidden deal in this
context, 150 the jurispathic approach in the Area 51 litigation produces
dysfunctional effects for the legislative process. The national security leg-
[While] more politically motivated than the judiciary's, [executive branch ac-
tion] serves a salutary role.., by reducing the benefits that legislators obtain
from passing interest group oriented legislation, thereby raising the costs of
rent-seeking. Viewing agency enactment legislation as a "deal" between in-
terest groups and lawmakers, it is obvious that the value the interest group
places on the legislation will increase symmetrically with the "deal's" durabil-
ity. However, interference with the power of Congress to control administra-
tive agencies impedes the ability of politicians to make credible commitments
to interest groups. This in turn lowers the price politicians can demand for
providing legislation to favored groups by reducing the willingness of such
groups to pay for new laws.
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 674 (1992).
148. See Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 6; see also Turley, Senate Tri-
als, supra note 118.
149. Clearly, some Executive branch lobbying is hidden as a matter of policy. In appro-
priations legislation, the Executive branch must ask for funding of projects that are classi-
fied and appropriately presented in closed hearings. In the creation of federal law and
regulations governing agencies, there is little place or need for hidden dealing with the
agencies. In the structure and process of command and control statutes, however, hidden
deals are unnecessary to achieve any public good since the regulatory provisions deal with
global issues unconnected to any specific project or secret. Cf. Bell, supra note 137, at 20
n.59. ("Obviously government agents may lie to individuals in conducting undercover crim-
inal operations, but such reasons for lying rarely apply to general statements to the general
public."). This is particularly the case with RCRA's national security exemption where
Congress simply mandated a process for the invocation of the prior authority under the
common law privilege as part of a comprehensive program.
150. There is little serious reason to believe that the government engaged in a hidden
deal to cripple RCRA in practice while preserving the appearance of a fully functioning
statutory process. A hidden deal would have left the statute silent on the question without
an express exemption process.
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islation is one of the least public parts of the political process. While this
secrecy is sometimes necessary in the area of appropriations, most na-
tional security issues in command and control statutes are handled in
non-public communications between agency and committee staff as a
matter of course. Most national security issues are buried within com-
mand and control statutes and are removed from the central "high visibil-
ity" components of the legislation. If legislation is driven by rent-seeking
to any great degree, legislative interest in national security components of
command and control statutes is likely to be limited and passing. Thus,
when a court refuses to carry out the enforcement of a statute in national
security cases, it is one of the least likely areas for legislative concern and
therefore legislative correction. As noted earlier, the low likelihood of
congressional correction may also be the result of the fact that, in the age
of statutes, Congress simply has little time for corrections due to individ-
ual judicial judgments. This further increases the chances that those areas
with the greatest rent-seeking elements will receive preferred attention
over areas like national security law. In this sense, the legisprudential
profile of national security legislation fits the predictions of Mancur Ol-
son.' 51 In this area, we have concentrated institutional interests with
highly distributed public benefits. Few citizens are likely to feel sufficient
personal loss to support activism over a few national security cases. The
informational and transactional costs are high for citizens in this area.
Yet, the Executive Branch would likely have an interest in blocking any
effort to correct decisions like Frost.
The result can be an area subject to the combination of raw executive
excess, legislative acquiescence, and judicial bias. In adopting a juris-
pathic approach, the court in Frost ignored the role of statutes as expres-
sion of public values. In the interpretation of a statute, the most useful
method for finding meaning in a given context, beyond the actual text, is
to articulate the purpose or public values underlying the statutory struc-
ture. In cases of command and control statutes, such public values are
most apparent given the comprehensive purpose of the legislation. When
Congress enacts a statute to govern an entire regulatory area with specific
rules of conduct, it does so to advance a stated purpose; to achieve a
public value.152 In the case of RCRA, Congress articulated the need to
impose a unified system of environmental compliance with full public dis-
closures. Later, Congress added the Federal Facility Compliance Act 53
to reaffirm the core principle that the government must meet the same
standards that it imposes on its citizens. The absolute application of a
common law privilege to effectively prevent citizen suit actions under the
Act deprived the statute of coherence. The result is that national security
issues can affect a great number of people with the least visibility or
151. See MANCUR OLSON, TiH LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACrION (1971); see also Turley,
Transnational Discrimination, supra note 6, at 355-57.
152. See generally, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989).
153. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
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detectability for public response. Likewise, it is the least likely to receive
open and deliberative debate in most command and control legislation.
Therefore, when a court acts jurispathically in the national security area,
the only remaining possible forum for resolving the tension between na-
tional security and other legislative values is effectively closed.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislative debate over national security provisions allows the public a
rare opportunity to demand the articulation of any trade-offs between
national security values and other public values. In a field that is by ne-
cessity cloaked and covert, the legislative process is the only fully open
forum for the balancing of interests outside of the unilateral decision-
making of executive branch officials. The privilege reduces the incentive
for the Executive Branch to engage in good faith dialogue in the legisla-
tive branch by offering a non-public process to achieve its interests in
nondisclosure. While reducing an incentive for legislative dialogue,
courts applying the privilege have rarely created as an alternative forum
for the balancing of such interests. Thus, the type of dynamic role of the
courts foreseen by Eskridge and other academics is frustrated by the ap-
plication of the privilege as an extrinsic inquiry to the statute. The state
secrets privilege represents the antithesis of a dialogic process. The privi-
lege prevents a discussion of the public values inherent in both the envi-
ronmental and national security areas. Any dialogue is quickly
extinguished in the name of one of the two values. What was missing
from the Area 51 case was any willingness of the Court to allow an open
debate over the logic and scope of the government's assertion of privilege
to bar any discovery or argument. The court specifically refused to allow
a hearing on the basis of claiming national security risks in the use of
ubiquitous generic terms like "hazardous waste." In refusing to allow
such argument, the court increased the costs to the public and the system
in legislative process. The executive branch can rely on the privilege in
any statute that does not expressly preempt its application. Congress
would then be able to pass public regarding legislation and the president
would be able to sign such legislation while reserving the power to defeat
any citizen suit through the use of the privilege.
The national security area creates much greater challenges for the pub-
lic in monitoring governmental activity and holding their elected officials
accountable for their conduct. There are compelling reasons for courts to
err on the side of command and control statutes in resolving conflicts like
the one in the Area 51 litigation. It is through the legislative process of a
command and control statute that some degree of majoritarian consensus
can be forged over the balance of national security and other public val-
ues. Moreover, the deficiencies in this area indicate a heightened danger
in the application of jurispathic devices like the state secrets privilege. If
a court removes these disputes from the statutory context, it increases the
legislative costs for the public while superimposing a judicial view on the
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balance of interests in the litigation. Kasza and Frost demonstrate the
ability of a court to force different outcomes in largely identical cases.
The use of a common law privilege can allow a court to achieve indirectly
what it could not achieve directly: the circumvention or rejection of a
statutory program. Much like the formalistic canons exposed by Karl
Llewellyn, the application and chosen scope of the privilege allows a
court to produce outcome-determinative results behind a veneer of neu-
trality.154 Privileges, like canons of construction, are often an invitation
for countermajoritarian bias. This bias is hidden behind a methodology
that offers a false and dangerous neutrality. The bias is not in the lan-
guage of the opinion but the initial selection of the privilege and the de-
termination of its scope.
The jurispathic history of national security cases is ultimately based on
a judicial perception of the legitimate needs of the national security es-
tablishment. Many of these views were formed at a different time. The
state secrets doctrine was widely embraced in the aftermath of World War
II and the course of the Cold War. This was before the advent of precise
satellite monitoring, open sky treaties, and the Internet. It was before the
Information Revolution and the political revolutions overthrowing the
communist regimes of Europe. Despite the changing scope and character
of foreign threats, the courts continue to apply national security doctrines
as unmodified and unchanged by time or social changes. Since the privi-
lege is not part of a statutory text, it has the ability to continue largely
unaffected by changes in public values and statutory schemes. This is par-
ticularly true when, as with the state secrets privilege, the common law
rule is crafted as an "evidentiary rule," relevant to the proof of a case as
opposed to the underlying claims.
With common law principles like the state secrets privilege, a case can
become less of a dialogue than it is a diatribe. Through the national se-
curity privilege, courts can simply refuse to balance interests of a statute
against the claims of national security. When combined with the informa-
tional and transactional costs associated with legislative changes, the use
of the privilege easily fulfills the countermajoritarian nightmare in statu-
tory interpretation. Of course, the Frost case may prove to be an aberra-
tion or a passing phrase in national security rulings. However, this
modest case study reveals a troubling ability of courts to influence policy
or marginalize insular groups in the age of statutes. The diminishing like-
lihood of congressional correction of statutory decisions in some areas
may have produced a corresponding increase in judicial power. This
power can be exercised in preventing citizens from using statutes to artic-
ulate and defend their values vis-A-vis their government. Command and
control statutes create a forum in the courts for such a dialogue. Since
this may be the only forum in which these voices will be heard, the com-
mitment made under statutes like RCRA have tremendous democratic
154. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
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significance for both citizens and insular groups. Yet, it was the court's
voice, not the workers or Congress, that was heard in Frost. It had all of
the clarity and finality that comes from a unilateral judgment unburdened
by rivaling interests or values of the legislature process.
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IN MEMORIAM: Roy R. RAY (1902-1994)
OY R. Ray was born in West Virginia. He was educated at
Center College in Kentucky, and received his LL.B. with Honors
from the Univer ity of Kentucky in 1928. After spending a ye r
on a fellowship at University of Michigan Law School, he was invited to
teach at SMU School of Law in 1929. He continued to teach at SMU for
the next 41 years. He was known for his humor and dedication to legal
scholarship both in the classroom and among the faculty. Even after he
retired, he was a frequent visitor at the law school and remained involved
in the law school community.
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